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ABSTRACT: A Model Statute to Authorize and Regulate Physician-
Assisted Suicide was published in 1996. This article  describes the
Act and some of its background and effects in detail , showing
that it goes further than at first appears. Specifically, the article
discusses the background and basic effect of the Act, the
principal provisions of the Act and their effects, the morality
and jurisprudence of the Act, the argument from autonomy, and
the argument from utility. The authors conclude that by
ignoring the moral traditions of Western culture, and focusing
only on the ethics and anthropology of autonomy and utility,
the drafters of the Act justify the dehumanization of the very
people  the Act is supposed to benefit.
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Die, my dear Doctor?—That’s the last thing I shall do!
—Lord Palmerston1
   Your State has, let us suppose, a physician in one of its university-affiliated
hospitals who is an admirer of Dr. Kevorkian, or a member of the Hemlock
Society. Your State has adopted the Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide (the “Act”).2
   You now have an unexpected interest in the effects of the Act. A friend or
a relative—your eighteen-year-old daughter or your nineteen-year-old
younger brother or your fifty-five-year-old father—has approached a
hospital seeking counseling and relief.3 Concerned about the sort of advice
your loved one may receive, and concerned even more deeply about what sort
of procedures may be instituted, you pick up a copy of the Act.
   On a casual perusal, you feel reassured: the Act seems to be addressed to
patients in dire straits, and not to cases like that of your daughter, your
brother, or your father. Perhaps you are right not to be concerned. But
perhaps you are wrong.
   This article describes the Act and some of its background and effects in
detail, showing that it  goes further than at first  appears.
The Background and Basic Effect of the Act
   The Act provides a general immunity from civil and criminal liability to
someone who, acting according to procedures established in the Act,
“provide[s] . . . medical means of suicide.”4 Thus the effect of the Act is to
afford an exception to the law of homicide, which would otherwise prohibit
                                                
 1Viscount Henry John Palmerston (1865), quoted in THE OXFORD BOOK OF DEATH 331 (D.J.
Enright ed., 1983).
 2See A MODEL STATUTE TO AUTHORIZE AND REGULATE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE (Charles H.
Baron, Clyde Bergstresser, Dan W. Brock, Garrick F. Cole, Nancy S. Dorfman, Judith A.
Johnson, Lowell E. Schnipper, James Vorenberg, & Sidney H. Wanzer, Proposed Draft 1996),
reprinted in 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 25 (1996) [hereinafter “Act” or “Model Act.”]. The material
on pages 174-196, describing and defending the Act, is hereinafter referred to as the
“Commentary.” The Model Act without the Commentary is reprinted herein at 219-226.
 3Or perhaps your concern arises from the fact that you yourself are a health care worker or
responsible for a health care facility. The second section of this article addresses the concerns
of health care workers and management; the fifth section raises more general philosophic
concerns about the Act.
 4Model Act § 3(a).
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activities protected by the Act.5 The Act also affords an immunity from
liability for wrongful death and malpractice,6 and for professional
misconduct.7
                                                
 5See, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10.5 (1980); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8 (1986).
 6See Model Act § 13(a).
 7See Model Act § 13(b).
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   What patients could be assisted to their deaths in reliance on these
immunities? Much of the language in the Act relates to this issue, but, as
described in detail in the second section of this article, this language is far less
limiting than it  may at first  appear. The Act comes close to the point of
affording a right to death on request.
   The Act is something of a think-tank project. The Commentary
announces that the
authors now include three attorneys who represent patients,
hospitals, and physicians; two law professors with interests in
medical and constitutional law; a professor of philosophy who
specializes in bioethics; a patient advocate and public policy
economist; and two physicians with experience in academic
medicine and community practice.8
An enormous footnote lists authors holding in the aggregate five law degrees,
three Ph.D.s (two in philosophy and one in economics), two M.D.s, one
master’s degree, and six current university posts including two at Harvard Law
School: a former Dean and the Director of Health Services.
   Absent, however, from this formidable catalogue is any trace of the parties
most directly affected by the proposed legislation. There is, for example, no
representative of hospital patients, or of the sick or elderly, or of the families
of the sick or elderly.9 No one is listed as having experience or credentials as
a nurse or pharmacist. No one is listed as having experience or credentials
specifically in the areas of hospice service, palliative care, death, dying, grief,
or mourning. No one is listed as having studied these areas from the point of
view of psychology, sociology, or religion. None of them appears to be an
expert on suicide.
The Principal Provisions of the Act and Their Effects
   The Act presents considerable grounds for concern both from the
viewpoint of those who care about persons who might be assisted to commit
suicide and from the viewpoint of those who care about physicians and other
health care workers, hospitals, hospices, nursing homes, and insurers. This
section examines the Act from each of these points of view in turn.
                                                
 8Commentary, supra note 2, at 3.
 9The Commentary states that among the authors is “a patient advocate and public policy
economist.” Id. This must refer to Nancy Dorfman, because she is the only author listed as
holding a degree in economics. Nancy Dorfman is the Chairman of the Greater Boston Hemlock
Society.
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Whose Suicide Can Be Assisted and How
   Among several legal reforms aimed at facilitating death that have been
proposed in recent years, the Act is especially extreme in the following ways:
   First, the Act is not aimed at simply letting people die. Rather, it  is aimed
at the termination of life through active intervention.
   Second, the Act does not contain narrow limitations as to whose life can be
terminated; it  does not narrowly define the conditions from which patients
must suffer before their lives can be terminated. Consider the language
pertaining to the condition of the “patient.” It  stipulates that “ the patient
[must have] a terminal illness or an intractable and unbearable illness.”10
Examine the elements of this requirement:
   “Patient.” Dispel the image of people flat on their backs in the hospital; no
such condition is required. The term patient is not defined. Context elsewhere
in the Act indicates that the term has lit tle or no excluding effect. People
living at home with their parents might qualify as patients.11 (In this article,
we will accept the Act’s abnormal usage and refer to its subjects as
“patients.”)
   “Terminal illness” or “ intractable and unbearable illness.” The key point
here is that these terms operate in the disjunctive: one or the other need be
shown, not both. In this respect the Act goes much further than the Oregon
statute12 and other acts proposed in recent years,13 and goes beyond the
rights recognized recently by the Ninth14 and Second Circuits,15 all of which
require a terminal medical condition. People who are suffering from the
requisite discomfort are eligible even though they have every prospect of
living a long life; those who have only a short t ime to live are eligible even if
they are perfectly comfortable. The great majority of patients who approach
death’s doorway with their pain well controlled by modern medicine would be
                                                
 10Model Act § 3(a)(2).
 11Model Act § 2(f) makes it clear that the Act can apply to someone “who is not in [a health
care] facility.” Nor, it appears, need the person whose death is to be assisted have been under
the care of a physician prior to the commencement of steps under the Act. See language quoted
in note 41, infra.
 12See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1995).
 13See infra note 158.
 14See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We hold
that insofar as the Washington statute prohibits physicians from prescribing life-ending
medication for use by terminally ill, competent adults who wish to hasten their own deaths, it
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis added), reversed
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
 15See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding “that physicians who are
willing to do so may prescribe drugs to be self-administered by mentally competent patients
who seek to end their lives during the final stages of a terminal illness”) (emphasis added),
reversed sub nom. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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eligible for assisted suicide under the Act.
   Further, the term “intractable and unbearable illness” is defined as “a bodily
disorder (1) that cannot be cured or successfully palliated, and (2) that causes
such severe suffering that a patient prefers death.”16 The most significant
element here—the one that seems to impose an important restriction—is
“severe suffering.” This term is not defined.
   Usually when the law accepts pain and suffering as an important element it
imposes an objective test—requiring, for example, that a reasonable person
under similar circumstances would experience the requisite degree of pain and
suffering; sometimes physical injury is also required. No such requirements
appear here. The Commentary makes it  clear that the intention is quite to
the contrary: “In the end, a bare majority of us agreed to allow anyone to be
eligible whose illness is incurable and who subjectively feels that the
accompanying suffering is worse than death”17 because “we realized that
whether one’s suffering is sufficiently unbearable to make death preferable to
continued life is an inherently subjective determination on which people
differ.”18
   Who would be ineligible for assisted suicide under the Act? Would your
eighteen-year-old daughter be eligible, for example, if she, though not
terminally ill, approached a physician and insisted that she was suffering badly
and had made the “subjective determination” that she would prefer to die?
Since Durkheim,19 social factors have been recognized as playing an
important part in suicides. People could readily use the Act to obtain death
where their decision was based only in part on illness: people who were also
motivated by unpopularity or unrequited love, for example, or
unemployment,20 divorce,21 or a history of sexual abuse.22 A recent article
                                                
 16Model Act § 2(d).
 17Commentary, supra note 2, at 11.
 18Id. Here the Commentary is somewhat misleading. Not only is the preference for death left to
subjective judgment, so also is the degree of the suffering and indeed, it seems, even the
existence of the suffering.
 19EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson
trans., Free Press 1966) (1887).
 20Unemployment is positively correlated with suicide. See Robert L. Jin, Chandrakant P. Shah,
& Tomislav J. Svoboda, The Impact of Unemployment on Health: A Review of the Evidence, 153
CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 529 (1995); David Lester, Suicide in Quebec, 1951-86, 76 PSYCHOL. REP.
122 (1995).
 21Divorce has been associated with a higher suicide rate. See Lester, supra note 20; Ingeborg
Rossow, Suicide, Alcohol, and Divorce; Aspects of Gender and Family Integration,
88 ADDICTION 1659 (1993).
 22Sexual abuse has been associated with suicide attempts. See Michael Windle, Rebecca C.
Windle, Douglas M. Scheidt, & Gregory B. Miller, Physical and Sexual Abuse and Associated
Mental Disorders Among Alcoholic Inpatients, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1322 (1995).
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states:
Among the common social themes that arise in exploring patients’
desires to hasten death are loss (or anticipated loss) of support
from a spouse, distrust of family members’ ability and willingness
to provide care, anger related to perceived disappointments, and
inability to relinquish the role of caretaker.23
   People might seek suicide because of the effects of alcohol or drugs,24 or
because of nonphysical psychological distress such as depression,25 low self-
esteem,26 despair, hopelessness, rage, or guilt .27 The Act would permit
assisted suicide in such cases unless the patient’s request was “ the result  of a
distortion of the patient’s judgment due to clinical depression or any other
mental illness.”28 Indeed, the Act expressly indicates that social problems will
                                                
 23Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient Requests for Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
in Terminal Illness: The Role of the Psychiatrist, 36 PSYCHOSOMATICS 445, 452 (1995).
 24Substance abuse was determined to be a predictor of suicide among a group of Danish
patients with previous suicide attempts in Bent Nielsen, Palle Petersen, Per H. Rask, & Gertrud
Krarup, Selvmord og andre dødsårsager hos patienter indlagt efter selvmordsforøg [Suicide
and Other Causes of Death in Patients Admitted for Attempted Suicide], 157 UGESKR LAEGER
2149 (1995) and alcohol consumption was associated with suicide in Rossow, supra note 21.
 25See Alan Apter, Doron Gothelf, Israael Orbach, Ronit Weizman, Gidon Ratzoni, Dov Har-
Even, & Sam Tyano, Correlation of Suicidal and Violent Behavior in Different Diagnostic
Categories in Hospitalized Adolescent Patients, 34 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 912 (1995) (reporting correlations of impulse control deficiency and depression
with suicide attempts); William Breitbart, Barry D. Rosenfeld, & Steven D. Passik, Interest in
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
238, 240 (1996) (reporting a significant correlation between depression and expression of
interest in physician-assisted suicide, but no correlation with pain); Harvey Max Chochinov,
Keith G. Wilson, Murray Enns, Neil Mowchun, Sheila Lander, Martin Levitt, & Jennifer C.
Clinch, Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1185, 1185 (1995) (“The
desire for death in terminally ill patients is closely associated with clinical depression—a
potentially treatable condition . . . .”); Paul J. van der Maas, Johannes J.M. van Delden, Loes
Pijnenborg, & Caspar W.N. Looman, Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the
End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 672 (1991) (reporting that 23% of surveyed patients seeking
death in the Netherlands did so because of “tiredness of life”).
 26Low self-esteem is positively correlated with suicide. See James C. Overholser, Dalia M.
Adams, Kim L. Lehnert, & David C. Brinkman, Self-Esteem Deficits and Suicidal Tendencies
Among Adolescents, 34 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 919 (1995).
 27See Herbert Hendin, Psychodynamics of Suicide, with Particular Reference to the Young,
148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1150, 1152 (1992) (“Rage, hopelessness, despair and guilt are
important affective states in which young patients commit suicide.”).
 28 Model Act § 3(a)(3)(A). “Clinical depression” is not defined. This section seems to make
even the clinically depressed eligible for assisted suicide when their judgment is not
“distorted,” a term also left undefined. See also § 3(b), which requires that the “actual use of
such means” of assisted suicide be a “knowing, intentional, and voluntary physical act of the
patient,” and § 5(b), which requires an opinion that the patient’s request is “not the result of a
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be among a patient’s motives, by providing in Section 4 that:
Before providing medical means of suicide, the responsible
physician shall . . . .
(b) offer the patient the opportunity to consult with a social
worker or other individual trained and experienced in providing
social services to determine whether services are available to the
patient that could improve the patient’s circumstances sufficiently
to cause the patient to reconsider his or her request for medical
means of suicide . . . .29
   The Act does of course require that there be some physical problem, but it
does not require that problem to be the patient’s exclusive or even
predominant motive. Someone might be eligible whose motive was in part to
damage, through suicide, the well-being of family or associates.30
   The terms “cannot be cured” and “successfully palliated” are not defined.
They may not significantly limit the permissively subjective character of the
Act. The physician can with today’s medicines greatly palliate the painful
effects of many severe illnesses, but so long as some residual effects remain,
patients could, it  seems, effectively characterize those effects to themselves
as “severe suffering” and take full advantage of the services contemplated by
the Act.
   The Act does not contain adequate protections against the patient’s being
subjected to pressure. This is a severe defect, since some patients will be
vulnerable owing to their fear and pain, their respect for and dependence on
their health care providers, and their worries about becoming intolerable
economic burdens on their families or on society.31 Recently the House of
                                                                                                                    
distortion of the patient’s judgment due to clinical depression or any other mental illness, is
reasoned, and is free of undue influence by any person.” See generally Annette L. Beautrais,
Peter R. Joyce, Roger T. Mulder, David M. Fergusson, Brian J. Deavoll, & Susan K. Nightingale,
Prevalence and Comorbidity of Mental Disorders in Persons Making Serious Suicide
Attempts: A Case-Control Study, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1009, 1009 (1996) (“Individuals who
made serious suicide attempts had high rates of mental disorders . . . .”); David Orentlichter,
From the Office of the General Counsel: Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 262
JAMA 1844, 1845 (1989) (“For many patients, the progression of disease will result in the
impairment of decision-making capacity, either from the effects of the disease itself or those of
drug treatment. Consequently, it may be difficult to ensure that a competent decision is being
made.”).
 29Model Act § 4, §4(b).
 30Cf. Hendin, supra note 27, at 1150 (noting that among the “meanings” that may be assigned
to death by suicidal patients are “death as retaliatory abandonment, [and] death as revenge”);
note 114, infra, and accompanying text.
 31See Sidney Callahan, A Feminist Case Against Self-Determined Dying in Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia, 1 STUD. IN PROLIFE FEMINISM 303, 313-14 (1995) (“Subtle pressures can all too
easily emerge to stop being a burden on others . . . . Women who have been socialized to be
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Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, in determining to oppose the
legalization of euthanasia, indicated its concern “ that vulnerable people—the
elderly, lonely, sick, or distressed—would feel pressure, whether real or
imagined, to request early death.”32 A leading American Medical Association
authority has noted the danger that “[p]atients who are enfeebled by disease
and devoid of hope may choose assisted suicide not because they are really
tired of life but because they think others are tired of them.”33 Similar
concerns have been raised recently in a New York task force report34 and a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.35
   The Act does require that the patient’s decision be made “free of undue
influence by any person.”36 “Undue influence” is not a very precise term and
is not defined. Physicians often exert a great deal of influence over their
patients, especially in instances of serious illness. (How could it  be otherwise,
when physicians have the survival of the patient in their hands and control
the system by which the patient’s pain is controlled?) How much influence is
“due,” and what sorts of conduct are appropriate? In a thoughtful article
about the Oregon statute, two physicians state:
The act does not forbid physicians from bringing up the issue of
assisted suicide with terminally ill patients, rather than waiting for
patients to broach the subject. . . . [P]atients with terminal illness
may be particularly dependent on their physicians and may
interpret the physician’s raising the topic as encouragement to
                                                                                                                    
self-sacrificing may be the most vulnerable to such pressures.”); Mark E. Chopko & Michael F.
Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life? 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 539 (1995);
Melinda A. Lee, Heidi D. Nelson, Virginia P. Tilden, Linda Ganzini, Terri A. Schmidt, & Susan
W. Tolle, Legalizing Assisted Suicide: Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED.
310, 311 (1996) (“Most respondents thought that some patients might request physician-
assisted suicide because of concern about being a burden to others (93 percent) or financial
pressure (83 percent).”). See also Charles L. Sprung, Leonid A. Eidelman, & Reuven Pizov,
Changes in Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatments in the United States: Concern for the
Future, 71 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 512, 513 (1996) (noting that physicians are no longer
exclusively concerned about their patients’ well-being but also are taking into account
concerns about social costs).
 32H.L. Paper 21-1 para. 239 (1993-94), reprinted in part in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL,
CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 96, 103 (John Keown ed., 1995).
 33Orentlichter, supra note 28, at 1845.
 34NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN
THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994).
 35Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d en banc, 79 F.3d
790, 837 (9th Cir.), reversed sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
 36Model Act § 3(a)(3)(C). However, no penalty is specifically provided. Further, no procedures
are required for determining when such influence has been exercised. Physicians may be able
to restrain themselves from exercising undue influence, but how can they determine whether
patients have been unduly influenced by others?
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commit suicide. Given the powerful psychology of the physician-
patient relationship, we recommend that physicians generally
should discuss their willingness to consider participating in assisted
suicide only when patients raise the issue.37
Under the Act, it  seems clear that physicians would be free to raise the
possibility of assisted suicide with their patients.
   Having raised the issue, physicians inevitably affect the decision by the way
they present information. The Ethics and Health Policy Counsel of the
American Medical Association reports:
Physician preferences may . . . become influential because the
preferences of patients are shaped by their physicians’ values.
Studies of decision making for health care problems, as well as
other kinds of problems, have consistently demonstrated that
people’s choices depend in part on the way that information is
presented to them. When considering a surgical procedure, for
example, patients are more likely to choose surgery when
presented with the probability of surviving the procedure than with
the probability of dying. Similarly, when patients are asked to
make treatment choices for advance directives, they are more
likely to choose treatment when the treatment is described in a
positive way. . . . When physicians discuss end-of-life decisions
with their patients, their own views about the desirability of
treatment inevitably color their presentations to their patients.38
   Having raised the issue and presented information to the patient, might the
physician then go further and recommend that the patient avail himself of
the procedures permitted by the Act? The Ethics and Health Policy Counsel
has noted “ the possibility that the hopelessly ill patient will not feel entirely
free to resist  a suggestion from the physician that suicide would be
appropriate . . . .”39 The Counsel’s overall conclusion is that “moves toward
acceptance of assisted suicide or euthanasia should be tempered by the
possibility that physician values may prevail in these decisions. One of the
greatest concerns about permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia is that lives
may be ended without the truly voluntary participation of patients.”40
                                                
 37Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274
JAMA 483, 485 (1995) (references omitted).
 38David Orentlichter, From the Office of the General Counsel: The Illusion of Patient Choice
in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2102 (1992) (noting that patients “who seem more
intelligent and better educated receive more time and more explanations from their
physicians”). See also Sprung, supra note 31, at 513 (noting that physicians “often present
information based on their own views and preferences, which alters patient decisions”).
 39Orentlichter, supra note 28, at 1845.
 40Orentlichter, supra note 38, at 2104.
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   The Act seems to permit any physician licensed in the state to assist  in a
suicide, even if that physician has not been treating the illness.41 In this
respect the Act goes beyond what is recommended even by other proponents
of physician-assisted suicide, who have recommended that such procedures
“should be carried out only in the context of a meaningful doctor-patient
relationship. . . . Rather than create a new subspecialty focused on death,
assistance in suicide should be given by the same physician who has been
struggling with the patient to provide comfort care . . . .”42
   The Act does not require that the “responsible physician” be disinterested.
A physician could therefore assist  in the suicide of someone on whom he had
previously performed surgery with unsatisfactory results.43
   Another questionable feature of the Act is its failure to provide for advance
judicial approval. Legal challenges after the fact are of course possible, but
health care workers who bend the rules will be protected if they establish “an
honest belief that the requirements of this Act have been . . . met.”44 (The
Commentary underlines the “ lack of any requirement of reasonableness.”)45
The importance of this brief phrase in sheltering noncompliant health care
workers can hardly be exaggerated. Disputes about their conduct will turn not
on whether they complied with the Act but on whether their noncompliance
was “honest.” (The relevant information will be recorded in documents
prepared by the defendants and kept in the custody of the health care facility.
The patient will not be around to tell a different story.)46
                                                
 41The Model Act provides that the “responsible physician” may assist, and defines that term
as follows: “The physician, licensed to practice medicine in this state, who (1) has full or
partial responsibility for treatment of a patient who is terminally ill or intractably and
unbearably ill, and (2) takes responsibility for providing medical means of suicide to the
patient.” Model Act § 2(h). This leaves open the possibility that the “partial responsibility”
may have been minimal, perhaps not even related to the illness at issue. Perhaps a physician
could qualify merely by catering to the request for suicide.
 42Timothy E. Quill, Christine K. Cassel, & Diane E. Meier, Sounding Board: Care of the
Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1380, 1382 (1992).
 43Some authorities have expressed concerns about the effects of physicians’ and health care
institutions’ economic interests. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
 44Model Act §§ 7(a), (c). An “honest belief” defense is afforded the responsible physician by
Model Act § 3(a).
 45Commentary, supra note 2, at 19-20.
 46Model Act § 6 requires a report to the Commissioner of the Department of Public Health. The
Act does not directly address the question of whether a plaintiff’s attorney would be able to
obtain a copy of this report, but does suggest that the report would be very difficult to obtain.
Model Act § 10(a) provides that “[t]he information that a person acting under this Act obtains
from or about a patient is confidential and may not be disclosed to any other person without
the patient’s consent or the consent of a person with lawful authority to act on the patient’s
behalf.” Model Act § 10(a). Model Act § 8(b) prohibits the inclusion of the patient’s name
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   Furthermore, the Act is extremely permissive in its individualism—that is,
in not requiring consent by or even consultation with the family of the
patient,47 or any other person closely involved with the patient’s life: for
example, co-workers, teachers, or school principals.48 The Act requires
various items of information to be furnished to the patient, but these items
include only “medical information,” not information as to the effects on
survivors.49 There is no provision requiring notice to next of kin—before,
during, or after.50
   So, let us return to the case of your eighteen-year-old daughter or your
nineteen-year-old brother, posited in the first  few paragraphs of this article.
Neither has a terminal illness, but each does have an illness, and each, in the
tumult of adolescence, deems it  “unbearable.” Or, in the case of your fifty-
                                                                                                                    
(requiring instead an anonymous coding system), and § 10(b) provides that the report “is
confidential, is not a public record, and is not subject to the provisions of [the state public
records statute or freedom of information act].” Model Act § 10(b).
 47See also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 827 n.100 (9th Cir.) (stating, in
dictum, that a statutory requirement of family approval “would raise constitutional concerns”),
reversed sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
 48The Act requires the physician to “counsel the patient to inform the patient’s family of the
request if the patient has not already done so and the responsible physician believes that
doing so would be in the patient’s interest.” Model Act § 4(c). This provision indicates that
the family may be “inform[ed]” rather than “consulted,” and makes a place for the patient’s
interest but not the family’s. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Elisabeth Daniels, Oregon’s Physician-
Assisted Suicide Law: Provisions and Problems, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 825, 827
(1996) (advocating a requirement that family be consulted because “patients may desire
assisted suicide for fear of being a financial and emotional burden on their family or because
they feel socially isolated. Families may best be able to address these concerns, whether real or
imagined, and thus provide another safeguard against inappropriate use of assisted suicide”).
Compare Model Act § 4(b), which relates to consultation with a social worker, and which does
not contain a “best interest” limitation.
 49See Model Act § 4(d). For a discussion of the adverse effects on children and other
survivors, see infra text accompanying notes 129-33.
 50One of the drafters seems to embrace a minimalist view of family rights and interests in other
areas as well:
When we go to the family for a decision . . . it sets a dangerous precedent . . . . [W]e
may be suggesting that family members have more life and death decision-
making power than we really want to ascribe to them. And this could come back
to haunt us in other areas. . . . In other situations . . . we are not so ready even to
pretend that families make decisions. The Twitchell case . . . a 1990 Massachusetts
homicide conviction of Christian Science parents who allowed their child to die
of a bowel obstruction because they opposed medical intervention on religious
grounds . . . is only a very recent reminder that our legal and medical
establishments do not accept even parents’ medical decisions when there is much
at stake and the decision is believed to be clearly erroneous.
Charles H. Baron, Why Withdrawal of Life-Support for PVS Patients is Not a Family Decision,
19 LAW, MED., & HEALTH CARE 73, 74 (1991).
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five-year-old father, he may be reasonably comfortable but is likely to pass
away during the coming few months. Your daughter or brother or father
approaches a well-publicized medical ideologue. Each one is fully eligible for
the treatment. No stay in a hospital is required. No one need say anything to
you.51 You may never get the full story.52
   Members of the social science professions may be involved, however. And
they can certainly make a profit  from it: the Act has provisions that help
ensure insurance coverage.53
How Physicians, Health Care Workers, Hospitals, and Other Entities May
Be Legally Required or Otherwise Obliged to Cooperate with Assisted
Suicide
   Imagine that you are a doctor or nurse or administrator at a hospital or at a
clinic located in a high school or junior college. You have no desire to see
yourself or your institution become involved in assisted suicides (and
especially not in cases like those of the teenagers mentioned above). But you
are concerned because you and your institution sometimes receive requests for
assisted suicide54 and your state has adopted the Act. Concerned about what
the Act might say, you pick it  up and read it . On first  perusal you feel
reassured. It  is written with the intention of permitting assisted suicides, it
seems, not requiring them. And besides, it  has a freedom-of-conscience
provision. You feel reassured, but should you be?
                                                
 51And if you do find out what is going on and rush off to try to dissuade Dr. Death, the Act
will not only permit but probably require the doctor to ignore your wishes. See the second
section of this article.
 52Another concern relates to the possibility that people may express a desire for assisted
suicide who in fact do not have a settled desire for death. Some people may be trying to send a
call for help. See Block & Billings, supra note 23, at 448 (reporting that “the patient’s request
for hastened death may be a cry for help in feeling valued, a plea for someone to share in the
grief”). Some people have only a transient desire for death and would choose to live if they
were given more time and the chance to think it over (and discuss it with their families). See
Chochinov, supra note 25, at 1185 (finding that of terminally ill patients surveyed, 44.5%
expressed an occasional wish for death but only 8.5% of these expressed a “serious and
pervasive” desire to die, and concluding that “[i]nformed debate about euthanasia should
recognize the importance of . . . the inherent transience of many patients’ expressed desire to
die.”). The Act makes some allowance for such concerns by requiring two patient requests at
least fourteen days apart. See Model Act § 3(a)(3)(D).
 53The Act provides that “[n]o . . . health care service plan, provider of health or disability
insurance, self-insured employee health care benefit plan, or hospital service plan . . . may
refuse to provide medical . . . benefits to an individual because such individual has requested
medical means of suicide.” Model Act § 12(a).
 54For statistics as to how frequently physicians and critical care nurses receive such requests
and from whom, see note 141, infra. See also note 180, infra (reporting the percentage of
deceased patients who would have preferred euthanasia or assisted suicide).
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   The Act actually requires individuals and institutions to assist  in suicide
under some circumstances. This is the effect of Section 12(a), which
provides:
No physician, health care facility, health care service plan, provider of
health or disability insurance, self-insured employee health care benefit
plan, or hospital service plan . . . may refuse to provide medical
services and medical benefits to an individual because such individual
has requested medical means of suicide, except as Section 11 of this
Act permits.55
   The terms “medical services” and “medical benefits” are not defined, but
could reasonably be construed to include not only collateral assistance but the
actual “benefit” of assisted suicide itself (“medical means of suicide,” as the
Act calls it). This appears to be the intention of the drafters, since they state
in the Commentary: “Unless physicians, institutions, and insurers opt out for
reasons of conscience under section 11, they must honor patients’ choices to
seek or avoid assistance in suicide.”56 In this the drafters are consistent with
their stated purposes, which are not merely to allow the practice of assisted
suicide but also to enhance its availability.57
   Besides direct legal requirements, there lurks the possibility of other
pressures, as described below.
   Many will object to assisting in suicides—probably more than half of
physicians, for example.58 How well are they protected by the freedom-of-
conscience provision? Consider several categories:
1. Conscientiously Objecting Individuals. These are the people with the
least to worry about. The freedom-of-conscience provision speaks
directly to their concerns. It  provides: “No individual who is
conscientiously opposed to providing a patient with medical means of
suicide may be required to do so or to assist  a responsible physician in
                                                
 55Model Act § 12(a). Owing to what appears to be a drafting error, this section is not limited to
instances in which the patient’s request meets the conditions of Model Act § 3 (which requires,
for example, that patients be eighteen years of age or older and that they have terminal or
unbearable illness).
 56Commentary, supra note 2, at 23.
 57See id. at 8-9.
 58See Jerald G. Bachman, Kirsten H. Alcser, David J. Doukas, Richard L. Lichtenstein, Amy D.
Corning, & Howard Brody, Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward
Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303,
306 (1996) (finding that 52% of Michigan physicians surveyed would not participate in
physician-assisted suicide even if the practice were legal); Lee, supra note 31, at 312
(reporting that in Oregon, 52% of doctors surveyed would object to assisting in suicides).
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doing so.”59
   But how well are objectors really protected? The Act’s intention must be
to forbid hospitals and similar employers from requiring objectors to assist
suicides. However, because this provision uses the passive voice and does
not even mention employers, it  loses much of its bite. It establishes no
penalty.
   Conscientiously objecting individuals must continue to worry about
suasions short of “requirements.” “Loss of privileges,” for example, is ruled
out in the section of the Act that aims to protect those who do assist  in
suicides;60 but here, in the section aimed at protecting those who do not
assist in suicides, loss of privileges is not mentioned.
   The suicide of a patient may be economically beneficial. Insurers and
HMOs often seek to lower their costs by screening out from their approved
lists physicians and facilit ies with poor economic track records. This
suggests that physicians who refrain from assisting in suicide (and indeed
physicians who are slow to recommend it) may be damaged economically,
and eliminated from major payment systems.61 Another possibility is that
of pressure from colleagues.62
                                                
 59Model Act § 11(a). Better drafting would have omitted the phrase “a responsible physician.”
A conscientious objector should not be required to assist anyone in providing means of
suicide, least of all those who are not themselves permitted to provide it because they are not
“responsible physicians.”
 60Model Act § 13(b).
 61Cf. Alpers & Lo, supra note 37, at 484 (warning that “it may serve the interests of a
physician or a managed care plan to provide a quick and inexpensive lethal prescription rather
than palliative care, which can be emotionally difficult, time consuming, and expensive”).
 62See Marlise Simons, Dutch Doctors to Tighten Rules on Mercy Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
September 11, 1995, at A3 (“A number of doctors [in the Netherlands] have said they feel too
much pressure from patients and sometimes from colleagues to engage in euthanasia when
they personally oppose it or when they are not sure the circumstances are appropriate.”). Cf.
Elizabeth J. Latimer & James McGregor, Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the
Ethical Care of Dying Patients, 151 CANADIAN MED. ASSOC. J. 1133, 1134-35 (1994);
Courtney S. Campbell, Jan Hare, & Pam Matthews, Conflicts of Conscience: Hospice and
Assisted Suicide, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1995, at 36, 40:
[The Oregon Death with Dignity Act] permits providers and institutions to opt
out of participation in the law. Yet to many hospice caregivers this provision for
dissent and conscientious objection appears to permit abandonment of a patient.
Thus, an important policy and practical question for the hospice community . . .
concerns whether fidelity and nonabandonment of the hospice patient requires
some level of participation by the hospice.
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   Conscientiously objecting individuals must also worry about attempts to
require them to perform acts that further suicide but that fall short of
“providing a patient with medical means of suicide . . . or . . . assist[ing] a
responsible physician in doing so.”63 Objectors may be pressured, for
example, to inform patients about assisted suicide. Such pressure may be based
on the argument that both informed consent doctrines64 and the federal
Patient Self-Determination Act65 require the provision of this information.
Objectors might further be pressured to refer patients to assisted-suicide
programs (even though many doctors would object to making such
referrals).66 They might be required to train interns and residents in the
procedure. Pharmacists might be required to supply the drugs.67
                                                
 63Model Act § 11(a).
 64See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CHARLES W. LIDZ, & ALAN MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 54-55, 165 (1987).
 6542 U.S.C. § 1595cc (Supp. 1994) (requiring disclosure of patients’ state-law rights).
 66See Bachman, supra note 58, at 307 (reporting that of physicians surveyed who would
refuse to participate in assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia, 38% would also refuse to refer
patients for those purposes).
 67Another concern relates to individuals who are conscientiously obliged to resuscitate
patients who have attempted to commit suicide. Might the hospital forbid such conduct,
authorizing “do not resuscitate” orders for suicidal patients? Might it discipline objectors for
disobeying orders? Might courts recognize a remedy on behalf of a resuscitated patient who
has been deprived of the “benefit” conferred by the Act?
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   2. Individuals Who Are Not “Conscientiously Opposed” Within the Meaning
of the Act. The freedom-of-conscience provision applies only to those who
are “conscientiously opposed.” This term is not defined. Might courts craft a
definition like that employed in connection with conscientious objection to
military service, under which only “generic” or across-the-board objection
would count? Such a definition might deny the protection of Section 11 to
physicians and other health care workers who were conscientiously opposed
only in a particular case or a limited category of cases. For example,
physicians who were willing to assist  with the suicides of patients who were
about to die might be required to assist  in the suicides of patients who were
not terminally ill, and physicians who were willing to assist  with the suicides
of patients whose families consented might be required to assist  in the suicides
of patients whose families objected.   The freedom-of-conscience provision
does not protect the physician or other health care worker who merely has
qualms or doubts; or one who wishes to refrain out of respect for tradition,
public opinion, the opinions of other patients,68 the opinions of colleagues,
or the strictures of the Hippocratic Oath69 and other provisions of medical70
and nursing ethics;71 or who has concern about exposure to legal liabilit ies.
According to an Oregon survey, twenty-one percent of physicians may fall
into these categories. Many physicians:
were concerned that the patient’s family might sue, . . . were
concerned about the possible harm if an attempt failed[,] . . . that
someone other than the patient might use the prescription[,] . . .
or that writing it  might violate federal laws governing the
prescription of drugs . . . , jeopardize their license to practice in
another state . . . , or lead to sanctions by hospitals . . . or
ostracism by colleagues.72
   3. “Health Care Facilities” That Object. The freedom-of-conscience
language takes special heed of this area of concern, providing:
                                                
 68See Ezekiel Emanuel, Diane L. Fairclough, Elisabeth R. Daniels, & Brian R. Clarridge,
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology Patients,
Oncologists and the Public, 347 LANCET 1805, 1808 (1996) (finding that “19.0% of patients
and 26.5% of the general public thought they would change physicians if their physician told
them he or she ‘had provided euthanasia or assisted suicide’ for other patients”).
 69See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
 70See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text
 71See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
 72Lee, supra note 31, at 312 (reporting that 53% of physician respondents were concerned
about suits, 51% about possible harm if the attempt failed, 33% about the possibility that
someone other than the patient might use the prescription, 25% that they might violate federal
drug prescription laws, 23% that their license to practice might be jeopardized, 24% that
hospitals might sanction them, and 25% that colleagues might ostracize them).
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A health care facility that has adopted a policy opposed to
providing patients with medical means of suicide and has given
reasonable notice of such policy to its staff members may prohibit
such staff members from providing such means to a patient who is
within its facilit ies or under its care.73
Concerns remain despite this provision.
   First, the health care facility must of course adopt such a policy. Many
small and sleepy institutions not actively represented by attorneys may find
themselves required to honor requests for suicide until they wake up and adopt
one.74
   Second, the immunity afforded by this section only permits an institution
to refuse to provide means of suicide. No immunity is afforded from the legal
requirement that patients be informed of the option of suicide75 nor from
attempts by accrediting agencies to require conscientiously objecting teaching
hospitals to provide instruction in suicide assistance.
   Third, the immunity applies only to an institution assisting in the suicide of
a “patient who is within its facilit ies or under its care.” These terms are not
defined. Uncertainty remains as to whether the immunity would permit an
institution to refuse to allow staff members to assist  in suicides of walk-in
patients.76
   4. Objecting Entities That Are Not “Health Care Facilities” (For Example,
Some Universities, Business Companies, and Schools). The freedom-of-
conscience provision applies only to individuals and “health care facilit ies,” a
term that does not cover nonmedical facilit ies and is doubtful in its
application to institutions that are not primarily medical in nature but do
offer some limited on-site or off-site medical services.77 Special concerns
thus arise about universities, business companies, and schools with health care
clinics. (Although Dr. Wanzer, one of the drafters, is the Director of Harvard
Law School Health Services, the drafters do not seem to have taken account
of the special problems the Act might pose for such entities).
                                                
 73Model Act § 11(b).
 74Even after a policy was adopted, requests might have to be honored for some time thereafter,
if the notice requirement referred to in the Act implies a waiting period.
 75See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
 76Another question concerns whether the policy, to be effective, must be facility-wide. Could a
chief of medicine adopt such a policy for a single department or does the use of the term
“facility” indicate that the entity as a whole must adopt it? And must it be a consistent policy
for the entire “facility”?
 77The term “health-care facility” is defined as “a hospital, hospice, nursing home, long-term
residential care facility, or other institution providing medical services and licensed or
operated in accordance with the law of this state or the United States.” Model Act § 2(c).
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   If it  fell outside the freedom-of-conscience provision, an institution would
not enjoy the privilege to “adopt a policy opposed to providing patients with
medical means of suicide” and the consequent privilege to “prohibit  . . . staff
members from providing such means to a patient who is within its facilit ies or
under its care.” Harvard, for example, might not be within its rights to
restrain an associate of Dr. Wanzer’s from assisting in the suicides of Harvard
Law School students.78
   5. Insurers. Insurers are required by the Act to cover assistance in suicide,
and are not covered by the freedom-of-conscience provision.79 There is no
protection for religiously affiliated benefit  plans, for example.
   6. Entities That Do Not in General Object to Assisted Suicide but Aim to
Control It. Entities falling into this category are impeded from regulating
assistance in suicide by Section 13(b), which provides:
No individual who has acted in compliance with the applicable
provisions of this Act in providing medical means of suicide to a
patient shall be subject therefor to professional sanction, loss of
employment, or loss of privileges, provided that such action does
not violate a policy of a health care facility that complies with
Section 11(b) of this Act.80
This wording raises doubts about such an entity’s right to enforce provisions
governing the time, place, and methodology of assisted suicide.81
                                                
 78Owing to the confidentiality provisions in the Act, Harvard might never find out about
instances in which he did so.
 79The Commentary implies that insurers are protected by the freedom-of-conscience
provision: “Unless physicians, institutions and insurers opt out for reasons of conscience
under section 11, they must honor patients’ choices to seek or avoid assistance in suicide.”
Commentary, supra note 2, at 23 (emphasis added). But this is not consistent with the
language of § 11, which applies only to “individual[s]” and “health care facilit[ies]”; it is
unlikely that an insurer is a “health care facility” as defined in § 2, and in any event the
privilege afforded a health care facility by § 11 is only that of “prohibit[ing] staff members
from providing” medical means of suicide; and nothing is said about a privilege not to extend
insurance coverage.
 80Model Act § 13(b).
 81This section would raise concerns even in the limited instance in which an institution went
no further than imposing safeguards to ensure that the Act’s own standards of patient
eligibility were complied with: for example, by requiring a potential suicide to show a driver’s
license as proof of age. A physician who ignored this proof requirement might still be
protected from discipline. Even if the physician turned out to have goofed and assisted in the
suicide of a sixteen-year-old, the physician might be protected if he acted “on the basis of an
honest belief.” Model Act § 3(a).
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   Thus Section 13(b) puts hospitals in an impossible position from the point
of view of self-governance and raises doubts about the rules and standards
hospitals must apply in order to receive accreditation, obey controlled-
substances laws, and avoid liabilit ies in tort. Even record-keeping would be
impeded, because of the confidentiality provisions contained in Section 10.
As the preceding discussion indicates, similar problems would be created for
certain universities, business companies, and schools.
   Conclusion. So, revert to the supposition that you are a physician or an
administrator in an institution which is approached by someone who seeks
assistance in suicide: perhaps the suffering eighteen-year-old mentioned
earlier in this article or the terminally ill but comfortable fifty-five-year-old.
You, your Board of Trustees, and your community strongly oppose such a
step, and so do the patient’s relatives if they happen to hear about it . But the
Act has become the law and on your staff is Dr. Hemlock, a supporter of Dr.
Kevorkian. Examining the Act with greater care, you may, depending on
facts that need not be improbable ones, be driven to the following
conclusions:
   —You cannot order Dr. Hemlock to keep off this case by threatening
dismissal or “professional sanction.”
   —You cannot even enforce by threat of professional discipline a rule that
would merely require Dr. Hemlock to act in conjunction with other staff,
consult the patient’s family or school, verify the severity of pain, or take
other preliminary actions.
   —Finally, if it  happens that the case is such a distasteful one for suicide that
even Dr. Hemlock wishes to abstain, the law may nevertheless require him to
go through with it  and require your facility to cooperate.
The Morality and Jurisprudence of the Act
   One of the stated purposes of the Act is “promoting patients’ well-
being.”82 Causing the deaths of some people—or, as the Commentary calls it ,
“hastening” their deaths—“promote[s] [their] . . . well-being.”83 The drafters
of the Act believe that people are better off dead when their deaths will
“provide relief from suffering.”84
                                                
 82Commentary, supra note 2, at 5.
 83Id.
 84Id. at 4.
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   Accept these views, and many things will change, not only matters
concerning the ill and the elderly. Encourage the growth of views such as
these as a part of the morality by which the United States government
operates, or its military, or its domestic security forces, or as a matter of our
people’s social morality, and many consequences not discussed by the drafters
are sure to follow. Encourage the medical profession to adopt and implement
this philosophy and its nature and purpose as a healing profession will be
fundamentally redirected.85
   Would such changes be a good thing? Surely the burden of proof rests on
those promoting such a fundamental set of alterations. The Commentary
offers lit tle towards carrying this burden. It  presents no sustained moral or
philosophical argument, and does not even cite much of the relevant
literature. Its failure to present even a prima facie case for assisted suicide is
sufficient reason for rejecting the Act.
   But we are confronted by an international movement that is sure to press
the point, both as regards assisted suicide and as regards other circumstances
of death.86 Let us try, therefore, to uncover and criticize its underlying
philosophy.
   The Commentary states that the Act is guided by “[t]he most basic values
that support and guide all health care decision making,” namely “promoting
patients’ well-being and respecting their self-determination or autonomy.”87
Thus, the Act has two ideological foundations. One is libertarian: it  aims at
promoting autonomy by extending the sphere of self-determination. The
other is utilitarian: it  seeks to diminish pain (“well-being” in context means
only that).88 No other sources of philosophical support are mentioned.89
   The next two sections of this article examine the libertarian (autonomy-
based) and utilitarian cases for the Act.
The Argument from Autonomy
                                                
 85See infra subsections 5 and 6 under the heading “The Argument from Utility.”
 86See infra notes 157-77.
 87Commentary, supra note 2, at 4-5.
 88See note 101, infra, and accompanying text.
 89The hint of another criterion appears in the Commentary’s reference to the allegedly
“meaningless” lives of certain patients. See Commentary, supra note 2, at 5. Cf. Baron, supra
note 50, at 74 (in which one of the Model Act’s drafters refers to the possibility that people in
persistent vegetative states may experience “years of pointless existence at great expense to
society.”). Other criteria that have been mentioned include dignity and “critical interests.” See
RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). For criticisms of similar criteria, see John Finnis, The ‘Value of
Human Life’ and the ‘Right to Death’: Some Reflections on Cruzan and Ronald Dworkin, 17 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 559 (1993).
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   As mentioned, the Commentary supports the Act on grounds of “self-
determination and autonomy”90 (without defining or expounding upon those
terms). In this the Commentary is badly mistaken. Whatever else might be
said in favor of suicide, it  cannot well be defended as a means of affording the
victim self-determination or autonomy.
   The major reason why this is so is obvious: suicide puts an end forever to all
choices. Any reasonable theory of freedom and related goods91 must take
into account the whole life; any reasonable argument that to act in a certain
way promotes freedom or autonomy must take into account consequences
beyond the immediate. Assisting people to become slaves would not promote
their freedom but would deprive them of it .92 To determine whether we have
promoted people’s autonomy or self-determination, we must consider their
futures as a whole. Assisting people in dying would effect an even more severe
deprivation of self-determination and autonomy than would enslaving
them.93
                                                
 90Commentary, supra note 2, at 5.
 91See generally STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM (1988); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts
of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 188 (1969); GERALD DWORKIN, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); THOMAS E. HILL, AUTONOMY AND SELF RESPECT
(1991); RICHARD LINDLEY, AUTONOMY (1986); Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs
Amok, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 52; Amartya K. Sen, Freedom of Choice: Concept
and Content, 32 EUROPEAN EC. REV. 269 (1988) (and other works by Professor Sen cited
therein); works cited in other notes to this section.
 92See generally Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFAIRS 93, 116 (1978) (discussing the slavery contract). Feinberg also examines the
proposition that individuals cannot alienate certain rights. See id. passim.
 93Leaving aside of course the life to come. As to that, see DANTE ALLIGHIERI, Canto XIII,
INFERNO 118 (John Ciardi trans., 1954) (1321).
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   A second reason why suicide does not promote autonomy looks not forward
in time but backwards. Any reasonable theory of freedom and related goods
must consider not only the immediate choice but also choices that the subject
may have made previously. This is why enforcing contracts promotes
freedom rather than restricts it—“freedom of contract” helps people to
determine their own (joint) futures. When people are required to honor
contracts, they are held to courses of action they chose for themselves. The
same can be said for other voluntary concordances: for example,
relationships of trust, of guardianship, of marriage, of parenting, and of
friendship.94 The implications for suicide are obvious: in those many
instances in which the subjects are married to people who rely and depend
upon them, or have children, or have obligations to fellow workers or
employees, suicide effects a departure from the courses they chose for
themselves, and assisting the suicide constricts self-determination and
autonomy rather than enhancing them.95
   A third reason looks neither to the past nor the future, but to the moment
of choice, and notes that acceding to a choice does not enhance the chooser’s
autonomy unless the chooser has chosen under satisfactory conditions.96 But
people who may seek assistance in suicide are necessarily ignorant of many of
the consequences of their choices and may be influenced by fear or other
distorting influences. The next section of this article describes such
circumstances in greater detail.
   A fourth line of argument raises the most basic issues: those concerning the
fundamental nature and value of autonomy. One view on this subject
considers autonomy and autonomous action to be goods independent of the
ends pursued. Thus David Richards states in Sex, Drugs, Death, and the Law:
                                                
 94Cf. Feinberg, supra note 92, at 119 (noting that while voluntary euthanasia may be
defensible, “[m]ost people in normal circumstances do have a duty not to kill themselves that
is derived from the rights of other people who rely or depend on them”).
 95But cf. John A. Powell & Adam S. Cohen, The Right to Die, 10 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 169, 177
(1994) (advocating a right to suicide even for parents of small children on the grounds that
“[t]he general rule in American law is that people do not have a duty to care for others if they
do not wish to do so.”).
 96This point appears often in writings on autonomy. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 515 (1971) (arguing that acting autonomously is acting “from principles that [the
actors] would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal
rational beings”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 371 (1988) (“The autonomous
person . . . must be capable of understanding how various choices will have considerable and
lasting impact on his life.”).
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[T]he idea of ‘human rights’ respects [the] capacity of persons for
rational autonomy—their capacity to be, in Kant’s memorable
phrase, free and rational sovereigns in the kingdom of ends. . . .
[T]he concern embodied in the idea of human rights is not with
maximizing the agent’s pursuit  of any particular lower-order ends,
but rather with respecting the higher-order capacity of the agent to
exercise rational autonomy in choosing and revising his ends,
whatever they are.97
This may be the mainstream understanding of autonomy among those groups
that sponsor legislation like the Act.
   The alternative view—and the correct view, in the opinion of the authors
of this article—asserts that autonomy can be understood as a good only in the
context of the ends autonomously pursued.98 Kant, for example, who never
wrote the “memorable phrase” attributed to him by Richards,99 instead
adhered to the view that autonomy involves acting consistently with
objective moral norms.100 (Kant also believed that these standards would be
contravened by suicide). Other philosophers, guided by Aristotle and
emphasizing virtues and virtuous actions rather than Kantian rules and
principles, understand autonomy as a good only when it  is instantiated as a
component of virtuous action.
                                                
 97DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 9 (1982) (emphasis added). A helpful
criticism of Richards’ theory is presented in ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 129-160 (1993).
 98Something like the argument here advanced is set forth, with reference to euthanasia, in
SUBMISSION TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON MEDICAL ETHICS BY THE
LINACRE CENTRE FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS § 1.3 (1993), reprinted in EUTHANASIA, CLINICAL
PRACTICE, AND THE LAW 111, 129-33 (Luke Gormally ed., 1994).
 99See John Finnis, Legal Enforcement of ‘Duties to Oneself’: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440 (1987).
 100See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 93-102 (H.J. Paton trans.,
1948) (1785).
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   Autonomy enhances the merits of meritorious conduct. An act of
courage—for example, standing up against the attack of a Nazi tank unit—is
the more praiseworthy the more it  is taken unconstrainedly: more
praiseworthy when it  is the result  of calm deliberation rather than a rush of
rage; more praiseworthy when it  is undertaken by a volunteer than by a
conscript under the baton of a sergeant. An act taken autonomously is more
thoroughly one’s own act, and usually reflects a settled intention to pursue
the good. The picture is very different, however, when the action is not a
meritorious one. Then the wider the actor’s autonomy, the greater the
actor’s culpability. Running away from a situation where duty requires courage
is worse, not better, when deliberate and uncommanded. Attacking an
innocent person is worse when the attacker acts free of compulsion, in full
knowledge of the meaning of the act.
   To establish, then, that an action instantiates the good of the actor’s
autonomy, more must be shown than that the actor chose to act. A successful
argument from autonomy must be based on a thorough understanding of the
future toward which the action tends, of the web of commitments that the
actor has in the past developed, and of the larger moral questions surrounding
the act. In the area of medical care, it  will often be easy to conclude that the
good of patients’ autonomy is served by assisting their pursuit  of health. The
good of autonomy is not served when caretakers accede to patients’
determinations to pursue death.
The Argument from Utility
   The drafters of the Act appear to rest their case on the classic, pleasures-
and-pains act utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.101 In this form,
utilitarianism is
[t]he creed which accepts as the foundation of morals “utility” or
the ‘greatest happiness principle’. . . [It] holds that actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of pleasure.102
                                                
 101This is indicated by their frequent references to “suffering.” (By suffering the drafters do
not seem to mean something to be distinguished carefully from pain. The importance of the
distinction is suggested in ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF
MEDICINE (1991)). It appears the drafters are not arguing from the type of “preference-based”
utilitarianism defended in John C. Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory, 11
ERKENNTIS 25, 27-28 (1977) and BARUCH A. BRODY, LIFE AND DEATH DECISION MAKING 19-21
(1988).
 102JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 18 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971) (1863).
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A cognate conclusion would be that the value of a human life rests on the
person’s capacity for enjoyment and for conferring pleasure.
   Are the drafters of the Act right on utilitarian grounds? Let us ask them
eight hard questions.
   1. Would Patients Attempt to Perform the Utilitarian Calculus? The
utilitarian argument must rest on the view that suicides under the Act would
improve utility. This conclusion must rest on the prediction that patients will
perform the utilitarian calculus, accurately computing the consequences and
seeking suicide only when the pains of continuing to live would exceed the
pleasures.
   Would they do that? The familiar assumption, by writers in the utilitarian
tradition, that human beings are “economic” persons who aim (skillfully) to
maximize their utility103 is indefensible in general,104 and is especially hard to
support in the instance of people contemplating suicide. The medical
literature establishes what common sense would in any event suggest: many
people contemplating self-destruction are in no way thinking like
Enlightenment philosophes.105
   Pain would not determine their decisions. At least that is the implication of
a recent major study: “having pain does not predispose a person to desire or
take actions to end his or her life.”106 Patients experiencing pain were not
inclined to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.”107
                                                
 103See AMARTYA K. SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 80 (1987) (“In the usual economic
literature a person is seen as maximizing his utility function, which determines all his
choices.”); George J. Stigler, Economics or Ethics? in 2 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
143, 190 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981) (“[W]e live in a world of reasonably well-informed
people acting intelligently in pursuit of their self-interests.”). For a general discussion of
these issues, see Charlie D. Broad, Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives, in PROBLEMS OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 111-18 (Paul W. Taylor ed., 1978).
 104The assumption is not supported by conclusive empirical evidence. See SEN, supra note
107, at 18 (1987). It is rejected by prominent economists. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS (1984); Amartya K. Sen, The Formulation of Rational Choice, 84 AM. EC. REV. 385,
386 (1994) (“A divergence between choice and well-being can easily arise when behavior is
influenced by some motivation other than the pursuit of one’s own interest or welfare. . . .”).
 105See generally EDWIN S. SHNEIDMAN, THE SUICIDAL MIND (1996) passim.
 106Emanuel, supra note 68, at 1809. This study also reports that “[t]his finding is consistent
with data from the Netherlands demonstrating that pain was the only reason for euthanasia in
just 10% of cases and a contributing factor in fewer than 50% of cases. It is also consistent
with data from American physicians who had carried out euthanasia.” Id. (references omitted).
Further, “[p]atients in pain were significantly more likely to find euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide unacceptable,” id. at 1807, and that “those who had pain . . . were not more
likely to have discussed euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide or to have read Final Exit.”
Id. at 1807-08.
 107Id. at 1809.
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   Instead, important causes of suicidal acts and desires include depression,108
“anxiety . . . impulsivity . . . subtle cognitive impairments”109 aggressive
tendencies, “a wish not to be here for a time (impulse control),”110 and
“preexisting substance abuse disorders.”111 Another factor is a self-destructive
state of mind:
Self-destructive patients with borderline personality disorder may
also seek physician-assisted death. Self-destructive patients may be
unconsciously seeking a physician to hurt or abuse them to
confirm their views of themselves as damaged and unworthy.
These patients often have significant associated depression and
impaired decision-making capacity.112
   Young people especially are likely to seek suicide when in the grip of states
of mind that can impair rational decisionmaking. For example, “[r]age,
hopelessness, despair, and guilt  are important affective states in which young
patients commit suicide.”113 Young people may assign unusual “conscious
(cognitive) and unconscious meanings . . . to death . . . [for example,] death
as reunion, death as rebirth, death as retaliatory abandonment, death as
revenge, and death as self-punishment or atonement.”114
   A recent study concludes that:
                                                
 108See supra note 25; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context—Supplement to Report 4 (Apr.,
1997) (“Many individuals who contemplate suicide—including those who are terminally
ill—suffer from treatable mental disorders, most commonly clinical depression. Yet,
physicians routinely fail to diagnose and treat these disorders, particularly among patients at
the end of life. As such, if assisted suicide is legalized, many requests based on mental illness
are likely to be granted, even though they do not reflect a competent, settled decision to die.”).
 109Block & Billings, supra note 23, at 449 (noting that [n]onpsychiatrist physicians
frequently fail to recognize, diagnose, and appropriately treat these disorders”). The authors
also state that “[i]n a more extreme form, self-reliance, perfectionism, self-control, rigidity, and
the tendency to be judgmental may be conceptualized as part of a narcissistic or obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder. In our experience, these are the most common personality
configurations seen in patients whose physical, psychosocial, and spiritual problems are well
managed and who persistently seek hastened death.” Id. at 450.
 110Apter, supra note 25, at 912.
 111Block & Billings, supra note 23, at 459.
 112Id. at 451.
 113Hendin, supra note 27, at 1150, 1152.
 114Id.
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patients with unremitting pain . . . are not the patients most likely
to request [euthanasia and assisted suicide]. . . . There is some
concern that with legislation of euthanasia or physician-assisted
suicide non-psychiatric physicians, who generally have a poor
ability to detect and treat depression[,] may allow life-ending
interventions when treatment of depression may be more
appropriate.115
   2. Could Patients Accurately Perform the Utilitarian Calculus? To
work the utilitarian calculus, a patient would have to foresee the
experiences that would be endured in the course of a voluntary
death in the proximate future, and also the experiential
consequences of the alternative.
   One alternative may be to live but to experience pain. An important
variable here is: how much pain, subject to what degree of medical palliation.
Neither physicians nor patients always address the possibility of palliation
successfully:
Undertreatment of pain is common, attributable to deficiencies in
health professionals’ education about pain management as well as
concerns about addiction among patients, family members, and
clinicians. . . . In the Netherlands, an estimated 85% of patients
withdraw their requests for hastened death after receiving better
symptom palliation. More than 90% of patients with cancer pain
respond to simple analgesic measures.116
   Furthermore, suffering has consequences for personality development.
These consequences are not always foreseeable and not always deleterious:
                                                
 115Emanuel, supra note 68, at 1809.
 116Block & Billings, supra note 23, at 447.
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What is the nature of [the] patient’s suffering such that death is
preferable to loss of control and loss of an intact self? Exploration of these
questions often identifies and highlights personality characteristics such as
self-reliance, perfectionism, self-control, rigidity, and the tendency to
respond judgmentally. These defensive styles may have been highly adaptive
in many spheres of life. However, in the setting of terminal illness, self-
reliance may be expressed as difficulty in trusting others, accepting help, and
being dependent; perfectionism as frustration with personal weakness and
neediness; self-control as intolerance of the noncontrollable vicissitudes and
uncertainties of illness; and the tendency to be judgmental as self-criticism
and self-blame over being ill and incapacitated. Giving up control, accepting
dependency, and tolerating physical deterioration may be so intolerable that
hastening death becomes a way to preserve the self. . . . Psychiatric
intervention may help such patients reframe their experience; alternate
expressions of control and of living up to high personal standards of behavior
include forebearance in the face of uncertainty and difficulty, the capacity to
model grace in confronting impending annihilation, and receiving help as a
means of permitting others to master their feelings of loss.117
Afflictions may lead to fundamental personality developments, and even to a
reconstruction of the character in which “the parts of the person are
assembled in a new manner.”118 Patients may come to terms with their
afflictions by “transcendence”—“[t]he sufferer is not isolated by pain but is
brought closer to a transpersonal source of meaning and to the human
community that shares that meaning . . . . [T]ranscendence locates the
person in a far larger landscape.”119 Beforehand, can the patient really be
expected to assess what such an experience would be like?120
   Another alternative may be natural death within six months. An important
variable in the calculus, therefore, is the likelihood of death. The American
Medical Association reports that “[p]rognostication of survival for the very
seriously ill is imprecise”121 and another authority raises concerns about how
well and fairly relevant information is communicated to patients.122
                                                
 117Id.
 118CASSELL, supra note 101, at 44.
 119Id. at 45.
 120See BRODY, supra note 101, at 235-36 (making a similar point in the context of a
preference-based consequentialist analysis). Some would argue that where the medical
problem is extremely severe the victim may eventually cease to be the same person, and that
the patient beforehand not only cannot well predict but also lacks moral standing to decide the
fate of this “other person.” See Allen Buchanan, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity
Problem, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 277 (1988), a work which relies heavily on PARFIT, supra note
104.
 121Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Council Report: Good Care
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   And then there is the alternative offered under the Act: a demise that may
be neither quick nor comfortable. Nearly a quarter of patients “who receive
life-ending medication linger for several hours to four days before death
occurs.”123 Death by taking pills, for example, can take three hours or
more.124 “A patient can spill the medicine or choke or vomit or fall asleep
before the full dose has been taken.”125
   Entering these alternatives into the calculus involves appraising the
experience of death. Not yet having experienced it , none of us is well
positioned to predict what it  will be like when we encounter what Henry
James called, when he saw it  approach, “ the Distinguished Thing.”126
   Many critics of utilitarianism doubt the possibility of performing the
utilitarian comparison where alternatives involve incommensurable
outcomes.127 The outcomes at issue here—life subject to pain; natural death;
suicide—involve qualitative differences as extreme as can well be imagined.
                                                                                                                    
of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 476 (1996)[hereinafter AMA Report, Care of the Dying
Patient]. See Roy M. Poses, Carolyn Bekes, Fiore J. Copare, & William E. Scott, The Answer to
‘What Are My Chances, Doctor?’ Depends on Whom is Asked: Prognostic Disagreement and
Inaccuracy for Critically Ill Patients, 17 CRITICAL CARE MED. 827 (1989).
 122See Orentlichter, supra note 38, at 2102; see also Block & Billings, supra note 23, at 453
(“[P]atients have been shown to misunderstand information they receive about such
emotionally loaded issues as cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Also, physicians’ concerns
about upsetting or frightening patients in the course of discussions of wishes for care at the
end of life may lead to euphemistic or incomplete discussions.” (citation omitted)). Further
complexity concerns the patient’s ability to influence the outcome by means of a do-not-
resuscitate request. See Rosemarie B. Hakim, Joan M. Teno, Frank E. Harrell Jr., William A.
Knaus, Neil Wenger, Russell S. Phillips, Peter Layde, Robert Califf, Alfred F. Connors Jr., &
Joanne Lynn, Factors Associated with Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Patients’ Preferences,
Prognoses, and Physicians’ Judgments, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284, 291 (1996) (“Do-not-
resuscitate orders were not written for almost half of the patients who wanted resuscitation
withheld.”); Orentlichter, supra note 38, at 2102.
 123Campbell, supra note 62, at 41 (reporting that in both the Netherlands and the United
States, “20 to 25 percent of patients” suffer such lingering deaths).
 124See Simons, supra note 62, at A3.
 125Id. (quoting a physician who practices euthanasia in the Netherlands as saying, “‘This
creates a lot more tension, also among others who accompany the patient. There are risks
because people are terribly sick.’”).
 126See EDITH WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE 367 (1934) (attributing to Henry James the
statement, “So here it is at last, the distinguished thing!”).
 127See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 86 et seq. (1983); JOHN FINNIS, MORAL
ABSOLUTES 17-24 (1991); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 111-18 (1979);
JOHN FINNIS, JOSEPH BOYLE, & GERMAIN GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM
238-72 (1987); Germain G. Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 21
(1978).
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   3. Are Pleasures and Pains Really the Proper Guides When Life is at Stake?
Many critics have noted as a defect of utilitarianism that it  leads, in many
circumstances, to an unacceptable willingness to sacrifice human life.
Utilitarianism leads to the conclusions, for example, that it  would be good to
induce cancer in someone as a part of a research project that would
eventually alleviate much suffering,128 and that innocent victims must be
executed when the populace believes they are guilty and will riot if they are
freed.
   Utilitarianism leads to these conclusions because human life has no
independent weight in the system, no value other than as a bearer of pleasures
and pains. In this respect utilitarianism contradicts universal common sense;
most of us cling to our own lives even in adversity and stoutly condemn
homicide whatever pleasure it  may confer.
   4. What About the Effects on Other Individuals, such as Family Members?
Radical individualism is a besetting fault  of the Act. The Commentary’s
allusions to “well-being” refer only to that of the patient. But of course the
effects of a suicide on friends129 and family members130—minor children, for
example131—will be dramatic in most cases, and often much longer lasting
than the pain that the patient may suffer.132
                                                
 128See Philippa Foot, Utilitarianism and the Virtues, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS
224, 237 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
 129Friends may experience “major depression [and] post-traumatic stress disorder.” David A.
Brent, Joshua Perper, Grace Moritz, Chris Allman, Joy Schweers, Claudia Roth, Lisa Balach,
Rebecca Canobbio, & Laura Liotus, Psychiatric Sequalae to the Loss of an Adolescent Peer to
Suicide, 32 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 509 (1993).
 130See DANIEL HASSENFELD, CALL OF THE SHOFAR (1995) (presenting a sensitive and perceptive
description of the effects of the death of a close relative); B.J. Smith, A.M. Mitchell, A.A.
Bruno, & R.E. Constantino, Exploring Widows’ Experiences After the Suicide of Their Spouse,
33 J. PSYCHOSOCIAL NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 10 (1995).
 131See J.A. Grossman, D.C. Clark, D. Gross, L. Halstead, & J. Pennington, Child Bereavement
After Paternal Suicide, 8 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 5 (1995), abstract
available in MEDLINE.
 132See generally Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 827 (9th Cir.) (“The state
clearly has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the interests of innocent third parties such as
minor children and other family members dependent on persons who wish to commit
suicide.”), reversed sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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   The pains of grief are not the half of it ; far more telling are the effects on
the relationship itself, which in a sense continues after death. As Proust
wrote, “a sort of cutting taken from one person and grafted on the heart of
another continues to carry on its existence, even when the person from
whom it had been detached has perished.”133 What interpretation—surely
often a devastating one—may a wife or a child put on the blotted signature at
the bottom of the page of their love?
   And here again pleasures and pains cannot be the only considerations.
Wholly unnoticed in the Commentary is the presence of obligation: the
marriage oath, the natural duty to support minor children, and the ties of
friendship.
   5. What About Consequences for the Relationship Between the Physician
and the Patient? Many physicians have expressed concern that discussion of
physician-assisted suicide may undermine patients’ confidence in their
doctors.134 Indeed, fifty-three percent of oncologists “ thought that
discussions between patients and physicians on ‘end-of-life care that included
explicit  mention of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide’ would reduce
patients’ trust in the physician.”135
   This should be a special concern to those who reject one modern view of
medicine—the highly individualistic view in which patient rights are
central—and instead accept a “relational” account. Dr. Eric Cassell urges
physicians
to reach out to the suffering person to bring him or her back with
the rest of us. You must communicate to the person that no
matter what happens or how difficult  it  is, you are going to be
there and help.
                                                
 1332 MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST 750, 1913-26, (C.K. Scott Moncrieff
trans., Random House 1932).
 134See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Winter 1989, at 25, 35 (“The patient’s trust in the doctor’s wholehearted devotion to
the patient’s best interests will be hard to sustain once doctors are licensed to kill.”);
Orentlichter, supra note 28, at 1844-45:
If the physician appears sympathetic to the patient’s interest in suicide, it may
convey the impression that the physician feels assisted suicide is a desirable
alternative. Such an impression may not be very comforting to the patient.
Moreover, if the patient decides to reject suicide, will the patient have the same
degree of confidence in the physician’s commitment to his or her care as
previously? In short, assisted suicide might seriously undermine an essential
element of the physician-patient relationship, the patient’s trust that the
physician is wholeheartedly devoted to caring for the patient’s health.
 135Emanuel, supra note 68, at 1808. This study also found that “19.0% of patients and 26.5%
of the general public thought they would change physicians if their physician told them he or
she ‘had provided euthanasia or assisted suicide for other patients.’” Id.
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. . . .
. . . . Social contacts must be facilitated. Relationships within the
family should be bolstered. Barriers to familial closeness erected
during serious illness by, for example, untruths, false optimism,
repugnance, and fear can usually be removed with lit tle effort by
teaching members of the family how to interact with a sick
person.136
   The case for this relational approach is especially compelling in respect to
the terminally ill who begin to discuss suicide, because:
[t]he vast majority of terminally ill patients who consider or
discuss suicide do not kill themselves. For terminally ill patients, as
for their non-terminally ill counterparts, talk of suicide is a signal
to physicians and family that the patient’s fears and needs have
not been adequately addressed. Therefore, the first  task for
physicians . . . is to elicit  the patient’s concerns and try to relieve
them. . . . Most terminally ill patients find reasons to continue to
live after their concerns or symptoms are assuaged.137
   These wise suggestions might not be universally taken after the adoption of
the Act. Two palliative care specialists recently expressed the apprehension
that were euthanasia and assisted suicide to become legal, some physicians
might come to hope for their patients to die:
An appropriate response of health care professionals [to a
patient’s request for euthanasia] is to listen carefully to patients’
feelings of despair and to embark with them on a shared journey of
exploration about meaning, all the while reinforcing that, as
people, they are of value no matter how frail and ill. Skilled
physical care must always be provided. . . . Can physicians continue
to strive to better the lot of seriously ill and dying patients when a
possible option is to act on their request to bring about death? At
what point in care would death become a more attractive option to
both parties?
                                                
 136CASSELL, supra note 101, at 246-7.
 137Alpers & Lo, supra note 37, at 484. Cf. AMA Report, Care of the Dying Patient, supra note
121, at 475 (reporting that “many persons initiate a discussion about suicide to evaluate the
degree to which others are concerned with their well-being and to evaluate their own self-
worth”).
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Physicians and health care delivery systems face increased pressure
to practise more efficiently and expediently and cost-effectively.
It  is doubtful that physicians could continue to care for seriously ill
patients who are not likely to survive without developing a bias
toward their patients’ earlier death.138
Nowhere does the Commentary discuss this effect.139
   6. What About Further Consequences to the Medical Professions? Further
consequences could be extensive. Studies suggest that a great many patients
will request assisted suicide140 and that a sizable percentage of physicians will
receive such requests.141 At issue is nothing less than a fundamental
reorientation of the ethics of the health care professions.142
                                                
 138Latimer & McGregor, supra note 62, at 1134-35 (emphasis added). For studies uncovering
defects in physician communication with patients and in physician responsiveness to patient
wishes in end-of-life situations, see note 122, supra and notes 150-52, infra. Leon Kass makes
this point as well:
[L]egalized mercy killing . . . .
 . . . will make a world of psychic difference . . . for conscientious physicians. How
easily will they be able to care wholeheartedly for patients when it is always
possible to think of killing them as a “therapeutic option”? Shall it be penicillin
and a respirator one more time, or perhaps just an overdose of morphine this
time?
 . . . . A physician friend who worked many years in a hospice caring for dying
patients explained it to me . . . : ‘Only because I knew that I could not and would
not kill my patients was I able to enter most fully and intimately into caring for
them as they lay dying.’ The psychological burden of the license to kill (not to
speak of the brutalization of the physician-killers) could very well be an
intolerably high price to pay for physician-assisted euthanasia, especially if it
also leads to greater remoteness, aloofness, and indifference as defenses against
the guilt associated with harming those we care for.
Kass, supra note 134, at 35-36.
 139Similar points can be made about the chemistry of the patient’s relationship with family
and friends:
[T]he absolute fixed tabu against suicide . . . has served to make the patient’s right
to expect the care of her family or community fixed and unquestioned. As long as
a human being’s natural life exists the family and/or institutional caretakers are
morally obligated to offer support and care. . . . When the option or choice to end
a life is morally permitted, then the interpersonal situation changes. One must
justify his or her choice to go on living and ask why one should voluntarily
continue to exact care or be dependent on others.
Callahan, supra note 31, at 313.
 140See notes 180-82, infra, and accompanying text.
 141See Anthony L. Back, Jeffery I. Wallace, Helene E. Starks, & Robert A. Perlman, Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician
Responses, 275 JAMA 919, 923 (1996) (“Among our responding physicians, 26% had
received an explicit request [for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia] at some point in the
past, and 13% had received an explicit request in the past year.”); Emanuel, supra note 68, at
The Model Physician-Assisted Suicide Act and the Jurisprudence of Death
207
   A physician who assisted in suicide would contravene the Hippocratic Oath,
in which the physician pledges: “I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody
if asked for it , nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.”143 Regrettably,
many graduating medical students these days are not asked to take the
Hippocratic Oath. However, medical authorities continue to condemn
assisting in suicide.144 The AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics states that
“[p]hysician assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the
physician’s role as healer.”145 A leading treatise on medical ethics states that:
                                                                                                                    
1808 (“More that 50% of oncologists [studied] had received requests for euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide.”). Cf. David A. Asch, The Role of Critical Care Nurses in
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1374, 1375 (1996) (17% of critical
care nurses reported receiving requests to engage in euthanasia or to assist in suicide). Asch’s
study is criticized in Colleen Scanlon, Euthanasia and Nursing Practice—Right Question,
Wrong Answer, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401 (1996).
 142Cf. Miles J. Edwards & Susan W. Tolle, Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Request of a
Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: The Doctor’s Anguish, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 254,
256 (1992):
[W]e were struck by the gravity of what we had done. Doubts kept creeping into
our minds. We each experienced a wave of disquieting emotion, feelings that we
had killed this patient. . . . This anguish continued in both of us for several days.
One of us sought counsel from a psychiatrist who reinforced our belief that we
did the right thing.
 143LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 3 (1943).
See also HIPPOCRATES, OATH, reprinted in 1 HIPPOCRATES 299 (W.H.S. Jones trans., 1923)
(“Neither will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a
course.”).
 144See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 226-27
(1994); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions
Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229 (1992); Public Policy Committee, American Geriatrics
Society, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 826 (1991); U.S. Doctors
Reaffirm Opposition to Euthanasia, BRITISH MED. J., July 6, 1996, at 11. In October, 1996, the
Congress of Delegates of the American Academy of Family Physicians reaffirmed its
opposition to the legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Thomas J. Gates, Euthanasia
and Assisted Suicide: A Family Practice Perspective, 55 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2437 (1997). See
also Latimer & McGregor, supra note 62, at 1135 (noting that experts in palliative medicine
conclude that “assistance or counseling in suicide is not a supportable pattern of medical
practice and cannot be considered as part of palliative care”); Orentlichter, supra note 38, at
1844, 1845.
 145Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS § 2.211 (1994) (the provision goes on to note that the practice “would be difficult or
impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks”).
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[The right to physician-assisted suicide] has almost never been
recognized in law or in codes of medical ethics. The traditional
belief is that we should altogether prohibit  such forms of assistance
in health care while authorizing letting die in a certain range of
cases. Standards of health care ethics from the time of the
Hippocratic oath to the present strictly prohibit  direct assistance
in death, even if a patient has good reasons for wanting to die. For
example, in 1991, the American Geriatrics Society opposed all
physician involvement in killing or assistance in suicide. In an
influential statement passed in 1973 and revised in 1988 and 1991,
the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs allowed forgoing life-sustaining treatments but prohibited
any ‘intentional termination of the life of one human being by
another—mercy killing.’ Whether letting particular patients die is
morally acceptable depends on several factors in this policy, but if
the deaths involve killing—even in circumstances identical to
those in which a patient is allowed to die—they are never
justifiable.146
Nurses’ ethics are equally decisive:
The American Nurses Association . . . believes that the nurse
should not participate in assisted suicide. Such an act is in violation
of the Code for Nurses . . . and the ethical traditions of the
profession. 
. . . .
The profession of nursing is built  upon the Hippocratic tradition
‘do no harm’ and an ethic of moral opposition to killing another
human being. . . .
Nursing has a social contract with society that is based on trust and
therefore patients must be able to trust that nurses will not actively
take human life.147
   A similar tradition guides the hospice movement, which was founded
specifically because of objection to euthanasia and in an effort to provide an
alternative to it . The National Hospice Organization has stated that
euthanasia and assisted suicide violate “‘all aspects of medical ethics.’”148
                                                
 146BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 144, at 226-27.
 147AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, POSITION STATEMENT ON ASSISTED SUICIDE 1, 3 (1994).
 148Campbell, supra 62, at 38.
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   Medical ethics may already be in a somewhat fluid state, as standard
practices are being changed by legal developments pertaining to managed care
and withdrawal of life support.149 Medical academics at Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, in a recent analysis of American practice conclude that:
   —“[d]uring the last few years, [American] physicians have become more
concerned with societal needs than with their individual patient needs;”150
   —it has become much more common in recent years for American
physicians to withhold or withdraw treatment in critical-care units;151 and
   —“[u]p to 79% of deaths in the ICU have been shown to occur after the
forgoing of life-prolonging therapies. Treatments such as CPR, which
initially were mandatory in all patients in the ICU, have become optional and
have ultimately become unavailable for some patients.”152
   Medical ethics would be further changed by the Act. More accurately,
medical ethics would be supplanted by statutes and regulations.153 Such a
development should be objectionable to physicians and other health care
workers because it  means further legal colonization of their professions. It
should be objectionable to anyone who believes that the historical traditions
of the healing professions are a reliable guide to practices consistent with
good medical care. It  will be objectionable to many; as noted earlier, fifty-two
percent of Michigan physicians in a recent survey said they would not
participate in physician-assisted suicide even if it  were legal.154
                                                
 149See Steven H. Miles, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Profession’s Gyrocompass,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1995, at 17, 18-19:
A shift in the professional ethic about medical killing from a substantive
conclusion against physician-assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia to
one of nonjudgmental process, consent, and bureaucratic contracts signals a
fundamental change in the moral boundaries and relationships between healers,
patients, and society. Meanwhile, the United States is restructuring the clinician-
patient relationship into new . . . configurations within powerful institutions in
which clinicians are accountable for the health of both individuals and of
populations on a finite budget. . . . The tide is running too fast to recalibrate this
gyrocompass . . . .
 150Sprung, supra note 31, at 513 (“Health-care reform has emphasized cost containment . . . .
[Physicians] have been told not to do everything that is in the best interests of their patient
but rather to do as much as is reasonable.”) (references omitted). See also John M. Luce, The
Changing Physician-Patient Relationship in Critical Care Medicine Under Health Care
Reform, 150 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 266 (1994) (urging physicians to embrace a
communitarian ethic).
 151See Sprung, supra note 31, at 513. For similar observations, not specifically about critical
care units, see Orentlichter, supra note 38, at 2103.
 152Sprung, supra note 31, at 513 (references omitted).
 153Section 13(b) of the Act affords an immunity from “professional sanction” for complying
health care workers. The Act also gives rule-making powers to the Department of Public Health
(§ 9(b)). Further, the Act provides that “[t]he Board of Registration in Medicine . . . may
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   Because the attempt to induce drastic changes in medical ethics would be
objectionable to many, its occurrence might result  in a fragmentation of the
medical profession. Fragmentation over assisted suicide is already afflicting
the profession of hospice workers in Oregon:
[The Oregon Death with Dignity Act] permits providers and
institutions to opt out of participation in the law. Yet to many
hospice caregivers this provision for dissent and conscientious
objection appears to permit abandonment of a patient. Thus, an
important policy and practical question for the hospice
community . . . concerns whether fidelity and nonabandonment of
the hospice patient requires some level of participation by the
hospice.
 . . . .[D]ifferences emerged not only among hospice programs, but
also within them, with some caregivers expressing fervent
opposition to participation and other hospice staff equally
adamant in support of participation. Thus, the moral fallout of
[the Oregon Act] . . . involved a collapse of the shared value
framework that has guided hospice for the last two decades.
 . . . .
 . . . . At the very least, every hospice will undergo some internal
discomfort, and, at the worst, complete upheaval and long-lasting
injuries . . . .
 . . . . [T]he nature and mission of hospice in Oregon will be
irreversibly altered.155
   The unity of a profession depends on its members’ acceptance of common
purposes and principles. When basic divergences develop over fundamental
and recurrent matters, the profession stands to lose its coherence. The crisis
among hospices in Oregon could engulf all the healing professions.
                                                                                                                    
promulgate no rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or with the rules
and regulations of the Department” and must submit proposed rules to the Department for
review (§ 9(c)).
 154See Bachman, supra note 58, at 306. For a discussion of the provisions of the Act aimed at
protecting conscientiously objecting physicians and healthcare facilities, see text
accompanying footnote 54 et seq., supra.
 155Campbell, supra note 62, at 40, 43 (1995).
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   These alterations could only grow deeper during the months and years after
the adoption of the Act. Some people profess contempt for slippery slope
arguments,156 but there is nothing foolish about fear of a slope when powerful
ideological groups—internationally organized under the umbrella of the
World Federation of Right-to-Die Societies157—are standing nearby waiting
to give people a push. Here in the United States, suicide-assistance legislation
was proposed in at least eleven States in 1995;158 the Act is the next (more
permissive) wave of this same assault. Were it  to be enacted, efforts to
broaden it  would undoubtedly follow soon after.
   Some efforts to legalize assisted suicide may succeed through challenges to
the constitutionality of legal restrictions. A state has a well-recognized
interest in “ the protection and preservation of human life.”159 However,
once it  has vitiated that protection in an important way it  may find it  hard to
defend “technical” limitations against assertions of irrationality, arbitrariness,
discrimination, vagueness, and infringement on the right to privacy.160 It
may become difficult  to defend the requirement that the assistance in suicide
be rendered by a physician. Why not nurses or family members?161 It  may
become difficult  to defend the competence requirement against challenges
brought “on behalf of” incompetent patients who “seek” death by proxy
consent. Thus it  may become legally permissible (even under certain
circumstances legally mandatory)162 to terminate the lives of the mentally ill
and other incapacitated persons.163
                                                
 156For a recent defense of slippery slope arguments and citations to authorities for and against
them, see Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide—Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 749-53 (1995).
 157See Rita L. Marker, Joseph R. Stanton, Mark E. Recznik, & Keith A. Fournier, Euthanasia: A
Historical Overview, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 257 (1991).
 158See A.B. 1080, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); H.R. 1308, 60th Leg., 1st Sess. (Colo. 1995);
S. 334, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995); H.R. 552, 117th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 1995); H.R.
933, 1995 Leg. Sess. (Md. 1995); H.R. 3173, 179th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mass. 1995); H.R. 4134,
88th Leg., 1995 Sess. (Mich. 1995); H.R. 339, 1995 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1995); S. 446, 42d Leg.,
1st Sess. (N.M. 1995); S. 5596, 54th Leg., 1996 Sess. (Wash. 1995).
 159Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (concluding that “a State
may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual
may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”).
160See generally Kamisar, supra note 156, at 749-53 (1995); Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against
Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional? HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1993, at 32; Powell &
Cohen, supra note 95.
 161See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 817 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
We would add that those whose services are essential to help the terminally ill
patient obtain and take that medication and who act under the supervision or
direction of a physician are necessarily covered by our ruling. That includes the
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   It  may become difficult  to defend the requirements that ensure that the
actual killing will be done by the patient rather than the physician.
Proponents of assisted suicide will argue, as some have already argued in the
New England Journal of Medicine, that such requirements are unfair to
patients who are physically unable to commit suicide.164 Thus it  may become
legally permissible, and perhaps in some circumstances even mandatory, to
commit euthanasia. A leading treatise on medical ethics states that “[i]t
seems likely that assisted suicide will be the driving force behind efforts to
alter rules against killing in medicine.”165 A similar strategy is being pursued
in Germany, where the German Society for Humane Dying takes the view
that legalizing assisted suicide is a necessary step towards legalizing
euthanasia.166
                                                                                                                    
pharmacist who fills the prescription; the health care worker who facilitates the
process; the family member or loved one who opens the bottle, places the pills in
the patient’s hand, advises him how many pills to take, and provides the
necessary tea, water or other liquids; or the persons who help the patient to his
death bed and provide the love and comfort so essential to a peaceful death.
Id.
 162See the discussion in text accompanying footnote 54 et seq., supra, of the ways in which
the Act may mandate cooperation in assisted suicide.
 163See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), amended, 757
P.2d 534 (1988); In the Matter of the Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
These cases extend a right to refuse treatment to instances where the refusal is made by a
second party “on behalf of” an incapacitated person. They are cited with apparent approval in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 851 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
 164See Christopher J. Ryan & Miranda Kaye, Sounding Board: Euthanasia in Australia—The
Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 326, 327 (1996):
The ethical distinction, if any, between physician-assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia has been debated extensively. Allowing voluntary euthanasia means
that in many cases it will be easier to administer substances intravenously and
thus improve the reliability of absorption, the rapidity of death, and the ability to
titrate the dose to obtain the effect. Disallowing euthanasia would make
physician-assisted death unavailable to patients who are competent to request
assistance but physically unable to administer the necessary substances
themselves. (references omitted).
 165BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 144, at 227.
 166See MARGARET P. BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END OF LIFE
257-58 (1994). There is also a body of pro-euthanasia opinion in China. See Peicheng Hu, The
Acceptability of Active Euthanasia in China, 12 MED. & L. 47, 50-52 (1993):
[I]n China, there has always been the practice of ‘filial piety’ in order to allow the
aged to live happily in their remaining years. . . .
 But the epoch has changed, and ideas are changing. With the development of
human society there has come new cultural thought—the life value theory. It says
that hopeless life can only bring about suffering, so it is not valuable. . . .
 . . . .
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   Things have got to the point in the Netherlands where, owing to the
leniency of the authorities,167 the rate of voluntary, active euthanasia has
increased rapidly in recent years. That practice accounted for at least 2.3% of
all deaths in 1995.168 Half of all Dutch doctors have performed
euthanasia.169 And, demonstrating that Holland has descended to the next
level of horror, many euthanasia deaths are involuntary or not based on
sufficient consent.170 Fully 0.7% of deaths involved ending the patient’s life
                                                                                                                    
 . . . . One hopes that by the efforts of the experts in medicine, ethics and law and
the public, active euthanasia will become acceptable to the people of the world.
See also Shi Da Pu, Euthanasia in China: A Report, 16 J. MED. PHIL. 131 (1991) (reporting
physicians’ acceptance of the practice).
 167See CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS
(1991); Richard Fenigsen, The Netherlands: New Regulations Concerning Euthanasia, 9
ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 167 (1993); John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down
the Slippery Slope? 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 407 (1995) [hereinafter Keown,
Slippery Slope]; John Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 108
L.Q. REV. 51 (1992); Alan D. Ogilvie & S.G. Potts, Assisted Suicide for Depression: The
Slippery Slope in Action? 309 BRITISH MED. J. 492 (1994); Johannes J. M. van Delden, Loes
Pijnenborg, & Paul J. van der Maas, The Remmelink Study Two Years Later, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 24; Van der Maas, supra note 25, at 669 (1991). See generally Simons,
supra note 62.
 168See Paul J. van der Maas, Gerrit van der Wal, Ilinka Haverkate, Carmen L.M. de Graaff, John
G.C. Kester, Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Agnes van der Heide, Jacqueline M. Bosma, &
Dick L. Willems, Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices
Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699, 1700
(1996):
In the interview study 2.3 percent of all deaths resulted from euthanasia, as
compared with 2.4 percent in the death-certificate study. In 1990 the rates were
1.9 and 1.7 percent, respectively. Assisted suicide occurred in 0.4 percent of
deaths in the interview study and 0.2 percent of deaths in the death-certificate
study, as compared with 0.3 and 0.2 percent, respectively, in 1990.
This study is criticized, and its darker implications are explored, in Herbert Hendin, Chris
Rutenfrans, & Zbigniew Zylicz, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Netherlands, 277 JAMA 1720 (1997).
 169G.H. Blijham, The Person from Porlock. Ethical Issues in Terminal Care: The Dutch
Perspective, 3 SUPPORT. CARE CANCER 61 (1995). See also Van der Maas, supra note 168, at
1701 (reporting that 53% of Dutch physicians interviewed said they had performed
euthanasia, and that 29% confirmed that they had done so during the previous 24 months).
 170See Keown, Slippery Slope, supra note 167, at 431-32.
If one includes cases in which the patient’s death is referred to as part of what the
doctor aimed to achieve, then the total number of intentional killings by doctors
[in the Netherlands in 1990] may not be far short of 26,350, in 15,258 (58%) of
which the patient had not explicitly asked for death to be hastened.
See also Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure, 10 ISSUES
IN LAW & MED. 123, 155 (1994); Van Delden, supra note 167, at 24; Gerrit van der Wal,
Unrequested Termination of Life: Is It Permissible? 7 BIOETHICS 330 (1993).
 For authorities raising similar concerns about American practice, see note 173, infra; Asch,
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without the patient’s explicit , concurrent request.171 In 48% of these “no
explicit , concurrent request” cases the physician had no information
establishing that the patient had expressed a wish for euthanasia.172 It  appears
that in some such cases the physician omitted to discuss the matter with the
patient’s family or even with colleagues and nurses.173
                                                                                                                    
supra note 141, at 1376 (noting that “it could be calculated that” at least 7% of critical care
nurses surveyed had on at least one occasion performed euthanasia or assisted in suicide
without a request from either a patient or a surrogate). Asch’s study is criticized in Scanlon,
supra note 141. See also Lee, supra note 31, at 311 (reporting that 29% of respondents
“thought that legalizing physician-assisted suicide could result in lethal overdoses being
given to patients without their consent”).
 171See Van der Maas, supra note 168, at 1700.
 172Id. at 1701, 1704. See also Loes Pijnenborg, Paul J. Van der Maas, Johannes J.M. van
Delden, & C.W.N. Looman, Life-Terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of Patient, 341
LANCET 1196, 1196 (1993).
 173See Van der Maas, supra note 168, at 1701-02. See also Van Delden, supra note 167, at 25.
Compare the following findings about American practice in the area of withdrawal of
treatment:
Despite physicians being incorrect about patient preferences for resuscitation and
continued life, they often present information based on their own views and
preferences, which alters patient decisions. They may make the decision
themselves because they believe the patient or the family cannot understand the
medical complexity of the situation or because they believe it is a medical
decision. Physicians may simply override the patient-family decision because
they disagree.
Sprung, supra note 31, at 513 (references omitted). See also David A. Asch, John Hansen-
Flaschen, & P.N. Lanken, Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining Treatment by
Critical-Care Physicians in the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians’ Practices and
Patients’ Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 288, 288 (1995) (finding that 82-83% of
U.S. physicians unilaterally withhold or withdraw therapies they believe are futile). “Many
physicians reported withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment without the consent
of the patient or family or without their knowledge, and some reported doing so over patients’
or family members’ objections.” Id. at 290. The authors state that their findings “may be a
disturbing sign of paternalism” on the part of doctors. Id. at 291. Cf. AMA Report, Care of the
Dying Patient, supra note 121, at 476 (“Physicians’ predictions of patients’ preferences for
resuscitation were no better than random.”); Orentlichter, supra note 38, at 2101.
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   According to leading Dutch authorities, “once one accepts euthanasia and
assisted suicide, the principle of universalizability forces one to accept
termination of life without explicit  request.”174 Among Dutch physicians
interviewed in a recent study, “23 percent said that at some time they had
ended a patient’s life without his or her explicit  request, and 32 percent said
that they had never done so but that they could conceive of a situation in
which they would.”175 A substantial body of Dutch medical opinion now
favors terminating the lives of babies when “quality of life” considerations
suggest it .176 This may in fact have been done in some cases.177
   7. What About Implications for the Law? While more and more of Anglo-
American law has become plasticized, “fact-sensitive,” malleable according to
the circumstances, until recently the law of homicide has not acquired such
characteristics.178 While more and more of the law has become “economic,”
accepting utility as a guide, and libertarian, accepting preferences and
consents of affected parties as prime determinants, the law of homicide has
generally remained firmly nonconsequentialist  and moralistic. Anglo-
American courts have not, for example, embraced the principle that appears
in Dutch euthanasia cases accepting that a force majeure or necessity defense
is established by patient suffering.179 Anglo-American law has traditionally
been uncompromising about the defense of innocent human life. It  has not
accepted consent as a defense to the crime of homicide. It  has not accepted
consent as a defense to charges of mutilating assault. It  has not accepted
explanations that a person’s life is painful or meaningless as justifications for
destroying it .
                                                
 174Van Delden, supra note 167, at 24. See also Keown, Slippery Slope, supra note 167, at 439
(reporting that “some of the legal authorities in the Netherlands now openly condone non-
voluntary euthanasia in certain circumstances”).
 175Van der Maas, supra note 168, at 1701.
 176Zier Versluys & Richard de Leeuw, A Dutch Report on the Ethics of Neonatal Care, 21 J.
MED. ETHICS 14 (1995):
The Dutch Paediatric Association reports consensus among its members
regarding the necessity to take the future quality of life into account when
reaching decisions regarding the continuation or dis-continuation of life-
prolonging treatment. The paramount importance of the discussion with the
parents is stressed. Dissension exists regarding active euthanasia in the newborn,
both opinions being respected. If dissension exists within the profession parents
should be informed and if necessary referred to a doctor who shares their moral
views.
 177See Simons, supra note 62 (referring to “incidents [of euthanasia] when people have not
explicitly asked for death, like those involving a comatose patient or severely deformed
newborn babies”).
 178See John M. Finnis, Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?, 109 L.Q. REV. 329 (1993).
 179See generally Keown, Slippery Slope, supra note 167; Johan Legemaate, Legal Aspects of
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in The Netherlands, 1973-1994, 4 CAM. Q. HEALTH CARE
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   In the wake of the Holocaust, it  was largely uncompromising Anglo-
American legal doctrines that justified the Nuremberg trials and the
international conventions which followed.
   We undermine these doctrines at our peril.
   8. What About Wider Social and Political Implications? Perhaps a very
large population would come to take advantage of the services contemplated
by the Act.180 A recent study found that fifty-five percent of HIV-infected
patients had considered physician-assisted suicide for themselves,181 and
substantial desire for death or interest in suicide has also been reported among
cancer patients.182
   The Commentary offers us not the slightest reflection on the changes that
may be wrought on the larger communities affected: on a town, for example,
by the practice of suicide among its residents. Some communities have
reported the occurrence of “copy-cat” suicides.183
                                                                                                                    
ETHICS 112 (1995).
 180See Jay A. Jacobson, Evelyn M. Kasworm, Margaret P. Battin, Jeffrey R. Botkin, Leslie P.
Francis, & David Green, Decedents’ Reported Preferences for Physician-Assisted Death: A
Survey of Informants Listed on Death Certificates in Utah, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 149, 150
(1995) (reporting that “about 16 percent of decedents reportedly would have wanted either
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia”). A large increase in the numbers of patients seeking
active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands is reported in Van der Maas,
supra note 168, at 1700.
 181See Breitbart, Rosenfeld, & Passik, supra note 25, at 239. Cf. H-M. Laane, Euthanasia,
Assisted Suicide and AIDS, 7 AIDS CARE S163 (1995) (“The calculated overall incidence of
euthanasia/assisted suicide among [persons with AIDS] in Amsterdam is about 26%.”).
 182See Chochinov, supra note 25; Emanuel, supra note 68, at 1808.
 183See Block & Billings, supra note 23, at 446-47.
Practitioners report anecdotally that recent attention to legislative proposals for
legalization of euthanasia, the publication of Final Exit, and widely reported
cases of assisted suicide appear to be associated with increased frequency of such
requests. This impressionistic data are reinforced by the evidence of recent
increase in suicide rates among Danish patients and by a study that documented
an increase in the frequency of suicide by asphyxiation, as recommended in Final
Exit, following the book’s publication.
Id. (reference omitted). But see Brent, supra note 129, at 509 (unable to detect a copy-cat or
similar effect).
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   And what of the effects on our public morality, and on our sense of what we
owe one another and what we stand for as a national community and as a
wider civilization? The understanding that “any man’s death diminishes
me,”184 that human life is sacred, and that social and political institutions
have a trust looking toward the preservation of life, has been hard-won in
history, yet in this century has been subjected to both violent assault and quiet
vitiation. Alter practice as regards preserving life, and one goes a long way
towards altering the principle that life ought to be preserved.
   People who are poor, vulnerable, and older are notoriously neglected in
many parts of the health-care system. An important American Medical
Association study released earlier this year underlines this concern as applied
to dying patients:
Hospice is mostly available to adults with . . . families with enough
wealth to provide unpaid care indefinitely . . . . [The] homeless,
[or] isolated, . . . are regularly excluded . . . .
. . . .
 . . . . Expertise in pain management is often not available to
patients, and comprehensive and enduring care is the
exception. . . .
. . . .
 . . . . In the current system of care, many dying persons suffer
needlessly, burden their families, and die isolated from family and
community.185
                                                
 184JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 87 (Anthony Raspa
ed., McGill-Queen’s University Press 1975) (1624).
 185AMA Report, Care of the Dying Patient, supra note 121, at 476, 477. The report also notes
that terminally ill patients “with serious pain might be effectively treated for an intent to
commit suicide by having effective pain treatment.” Id. at 475.
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An increasingly uncaring attitude toward the poor and the elderly can be
detected today in many quarters. If assisted suicide were legalized, it  is not
unlikely that we would eventually encounter the following arguments: “If the
poor and elderly are so badly off, they can always get a physician-assisted
suicide;”186 “Why respond to calls for better palliative care and pain
management when people can choose suicide;” and, “Why spend money for
hospices? They are uneconomical because they will only diminish the number
of people choosing suicide.”187
   Such consequences are especially likely where, as under this Act, the
medical profession is recruited into the projects of death. A policy generally
applied by doctors, in the hospitals to which we entrust our sick friends, and
where we have our babies, will come to be wrapped with the authority of the
physician’s prestige as a minister to the body and an anciently recognized
guardian of health.
   This prestige helped the Nazis conceal and legitimize the Holocaust:
                                                
 186See also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 826 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[w]e are
reluctant to say that, in a society in which the costs of protracted health care can be so
exorbitant, it is improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the economic welfare of
their families and loved ones into consideration”), reversed sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
 187See AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, supra note 147, at 3 (concluding that “[t]he
availability of assisted suicide could foreseeably weaken the goal of providing quality care for
the dying”). Hendin, supra note 168: “[E]uthanasia, intended originally for the exceptional
case, has become an accepted way of dealing with serious or terminal illness in the
Netherlands. In the process, palliative care is one of the casualties, while hospice care lags
behind that of other countries. For the Dutch, accepting the option of euthanasia seems to be
costing them the opportunity to take advantage of the developments in palliative care of the
past decade.”
 Under the Model Act, the “responsible physician” must “offer to the patient all medical care,
including hospice care if available, that is consistent with accepted clinical practice and that
can practicably be made available to the patient for the purpose of curing or palliating the
patient’s illness or alleviating symptoms.” Model Act § 4(a). If the patient cannot afford it, it
need not be offered. See Commentary, supra note 2, at 20.
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The key word in the healing-killing reversal [at Auschwitz] is
Sonderbehandlung, or ‘special treatment’ . . . . We have seen how
this euphemism for killing insinuated something on the order of
medical therapy, along with a standing that was ‘more legal than
legal.’ In general bureaucratic usage, ‘special’ [the prefix] was the
opposite of ‘regular’: special trains and regular trains, special
courts and regular courts, etc. Special procedures were deemed
necessary because of special conditions. The word not only
detoxified killing and aided in its routinization but, at  the same
time, infused that killing with a near-mystical priority for the
‘Auschwitz self’ in carrying it  out. Killing assumed a certain feeling
of necessity and appropriateness, enhanced by the medical, as well
as the military, aura surrounding it .188
Beyond Autonomy and Utility
   A more fundamental point is that the ethics and anthropology of
autonomy (in the sense understood by the drafters)189 and of utilitarianism
are limited and partial. They emphasize only the shell of a moral human act
or a satisfactory human life—its edges. They recognize one of its conditions
(the absence of restraint) and one of its usual outcomes (pleasure) but omit
much of its substance.
   But the roots of our law and much of our civilization reach into another
moral tradition, informed not by Hume and Hobbes and Smith and Bentham
and Mill but by Aristotle, by Judaism, and by Christianity.190 This tradition
locates the good of the human life not in autonomy or pleasure but in virtue;
in a life’s projects and in its intentions—for example, in friendship,
philosophy, and faith. In the Stoic tradition, the good is identified with the
person’s status as a “spark of the Divine.” In the Jewish and Christian
traditions, the sacred quality of human lives arises from their creation in the
image of God, with a standing divinely conferred:
When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers,
the moon and stars that You set in place,
what is man that You have been mindful of him,
mortal man that You have taken note of him,
                                                
 188ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
150-51 (1986) (the brackets around “the prefix” are also present in the original).
 189See fourth section of this article entitled “The Argument from Autonomy.”
 190For a close analysis and a review of several traditions, see JOHN KLEINIG, VALUING LIFE
(1991). For a valuable criticism of euthanasia from a nonconsequentialist point of view, see
John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note
32, at 23. See also John Finnis, The Fragile Case for Euthanasia: A Reply to John Harris, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 32, at 46; John Finnis, Misunderstanding the Case Against
Euthanasia: Response to Harris’s First Reply, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 32, at 62.
220 Issues in Law & Medicine, Volume 13, Number 2, 1997
that You have made him little less than divine . . . .191
   The drafters make no allusion to these traditions, nor even to modern
versions of humanism that look beyond rights and autonomy.192 Nor do the
drafters discuss the fiduciary duty of the physician, the Hippocratic tradition,
or the profound horror that our culture directs towards an act of homicide.
Nowhere in the Act, nor in the highly footnoted Commentary, do we find the
ghost of a reference to this set of ethical traditions.
   These omissions can come as no surprise to someone who inhabits today’s
academic world, where entire stretches of terrain have been systematically
defoliated of classical and theistic thought. These omissions are no surprise,
but still a disgrace. The disgrace is worse in light of the fact that this
legislation is proposed to govern the conduct of a population not composed
entirely of politically-correct teaching assistants and graduate students, but
also including, for example, professionals in the many religiously affiliated
medical institutions of this country. How can these drafters presume to
prepare model legislation without taking the slightest account of the major
moral traditions of the affected populations?
       Abandon these central traditions, disregard their insights into the human
good, limit one’s anthropology to the shells of autonomy and pleasure, and
you will be driven to an equally limited view of the value of human beings;
you will be led, like Hume in his essay On Suicide, to compare them to
oysters.193 Limit your anthropology in these ways and you limit the
conditions under which you see any sense in many peoples’ survival. You will
say, with Nietzsche: “In a certain state it  is indecent to go on living. To
vegetate on in cowardly dependence on physicians and medicaments after the
meaning of life, the right to life, has been lost ought to entail the profound
contempt of society.”194
                                                
 191Psalm 8, in TANAKH: JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES
ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 1115 (Jewish Publication Society trans., 1985).
See also EUTHANASIA AND CLINICAL PRACTICE: TRENDS, PRINCIPLES AND ALTERNATIVES: A
WORKING PARTY REPORT (1982), reprinted in EUTHANASIA, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND THE LAW 1,
supra note 98, at 51-58 (describing the Christian and especially the Roman Catholic
condemnation of euthanasia); EVANGELIUM VITAE (Encyclical of Pope John Paul II, March 25,
1995) (discussing the condemnation of killing in the Christian tradition); Damien Keown &
John Keown, Killing, Karma and Caring: Euthanasia in Buddhism and Christianity, 21 J.
MED. ETHICS 265 (1995) (describing the sanctity-of-life objection to killing in the Christian
and Buddhist traditions).
 192See, e.g., BRODY, supra note 101, at 32-33 (advancing the view that respect for personhood
goes beyond respecting people’s rights, and that therefore physicians must try to save the
lives of any people who have tried to kill themselves); Callahan, supra note 31.
 193See David Hume, On Suicide, in DAVID HUME, ESSAYS ON SUICIDE, AND THE IMMORTALITY OF
THE SOUL 1, 11 (Thoemmes Press 1992) (1783) (“the life of a man is of no greater importance to
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   You will be led to reconstruct our jurisprudence in a way that makes it
possible to put an end to such people.
  
                                                                                                                    
the universe than that of an oyster”). See also RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1990) (“‘Economic man’ is . . . a person whose behavior is completely
determined by incentives; his rationality is no different from that of a pigeon or a rat.”). Judge
Posner seems not to be agreeing with this anthropology but merely to be reporting it.
 194FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS AND THE ANTICHRIST 88 (R.J. Hollindale trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1889 & 1895).
